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THE PAIN RELIEF PROMOTION ACT: WILL IT
SPELL DEATH TO "DEATH WITH DIGNITY"
OR IS IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Joy Fallek *
INTRODUCTION
There is no evidence that Congress, in the CSA [Controlled
Substances Act], intended to displace the states as the primary
regulators of the medical profession, or to override a state's de-
termination as to what constitutes legitimate medical practice in
the absence of a federal law prohibiting that practice.'
In writing these words to Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman
of the House of Representatives' Judiciary Committee, United
States Attorney General Janet Reno may have had no idea that she
was throwing down the gauntlet, daring House conservatives to
act.2 The year was 1998, and Reno was offering her ruling on
whether the latest of several efforts to derail Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act by amending the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA")
could prevent Oregon doctors from prescribing controlled sub-
stances for terminally ill patients who wished to commit suicide.
The right to physician-assisted suicide in limited circumstances,
supported by Oregonians both in a voter initiative election and
later in a referendum, 4 had strong opponents in the House of Rep-
* J.D. Fordham University School of Law, 2001; M.S.W., University of Michi-
gan; B.A. (Psychology), Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. I
would like to thank Victor Fallek for making this adventure into the world of law
possible. Thanks to my daughter Ronit Fallek and my mother Jenny Brooks for love
and support. Thanks to Professor Benjamin C. Zipursky for time, patience and gui-
dance, to Professor James E. Fleming for helpful advice, and to the editors and staff of
the FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL for doing on my behalf what they do so well.
1. Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States, to Chairman
Henry J. Hyde, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (June 5,
1998) (available at the Internet address of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.
House of Representatives (visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://house.gov/judiciary/at-
tygen.htm>) [hereinafter Reno Letter].
2. Senate Assistant Majority Leader Don Nickles is an Oklahoma Republican
who is open about how his political views are shaped by Catholicism and a "Christian
world view." Assisted Suicide: A New Attack, THE OREGONIAN, Sept. 8, 1999, at A8.
He described Reno's letter as a "challenge" and proposed legislation to meet this
challenge. 145 CONG. REC. S14774 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999).
3. See Reno Letter, supra note 1.
4. See infra Part I.
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resentatives. Henry Hyde responded to Janet Reno's de facto en-
dorsement of the Oregon Act by proposing new legislation, the
Lethal Drug Abuse and Prevention Act of 1998 ("LDAP Act"),
which would clarify that doctors could not prescribe controlled
substances for suicide.5 When the LDAP Act stalled in Congress, a
new bill, the Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999 ("PRPA") was
crafted.6 The PRPA, passed by the House of Representatives on
October 27, 1999, 7 explicitly states that controlled substances may
not be dispensed intentionally to assist suicide or to cause death,
and that the Attorney General must give no force or effect to any
state law that authorizes assisted suicide.8
There is little doubt that should the PRPA become law, support-
ers of Oregon's assisted-suicide law will challenge the Act as un-
constitutional. This Note examines possible constitutional claims
that opponents of the PRPA may bring. Part I discusses the crea-
tion, structure, and implementation of the Oregon Death with Dig-
nity Act. It then discusses two congressional responses, the LDAP
Act and the PRPA, intended to limit the ability of Oregonians to
implement physician-assisted suicide. Part II examines areas of
controversy created by the PRPA. Part III will discuss recent con-
stitutional decisions, both those on physician-assisted suicide and
others that show the federalist leanings of the current Supreme
Court. Furthermore, it will look at several constitutional provi-
sions as well as the concept of provisional adjudication, all of which
are applicable to an analysis of the constitutionality of the PRPA.
Part IV will argue why the Supreme Court should rule the PRPA
unconstitutional. This Note concludes that the PRPA is a prema-
ture attempt by opponents of physician-assisted suicide to cut off
experimentation and debate on a controversial social issue and that
the Supreme Court should prevent this limitation on state
experimentation.
I. THE DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT AND THE PAIN RELIEF
PROMOTION ACT
A. Oregon Votes For Physician-Assisted Suicide
It is perhaps not surprising that Oregon has been the first state in
the Union to tackle the contentious assisted-suicide issue. Ore-
5. See H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 2, at 5-6 (1999) (referring to the Lethal Drug
Abuse Prevention Act, H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998)).
6. See H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999).
7. See 145 CONG. REC. H10903 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999).
8. See H.R. 2260.
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gon's founders have been described as a group of "rugged and ro-
bust individuals" with "highly moral as well as irreverent views"
who wished to create "a free society unfettered by the governmen-
tal imposition of some people's views of morality on the free ex-
pression of others."9 Oregonians are mavericks on many social
issues. They legalized abortion years before Roe v. Wade'° and
were among the first to decriminalize the use of marijuana and ap-
prove its medical uses." They were also the first to conduct an
election entirely by mail 2 and, in fact, mailed ballots to their citi-
zens to vote on assisted suicide.' 3
Oregon's state constitution permits voter initiatives, proposed
legislation introduced by private citizens that is later voted on by
the electorate.' 4 The Death with Dignity Act began with just such
an initiative. Elvin Sinnard, an Oregon man who had secretly
helped his terminally-ill wife die after she had suffered for eighteen
months from a debilitating heart disease, hated having to act sur-
reptitiously.' 5 Working with a group of doctors and lawyers, the
future members of Oregon Right to Die, Sinnard drafted the
initiative.' 6
In their 1994 election, Oregon citizens approved Ballot Measure
16, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, legalizing physician-as-
sisted suicide in limited circumstances.' 7 The election had a 68%
turnout, with 51.3% in support of the right of terminally-ill adults
to obtain prescriptions for lethal drugs and 48.7% in opposition.' 8
Any pleasure that the victors may have felt after their narrow vic-
tory was soon to fade. On November 23, 1994, fifteen days before
9. State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 16 (Or. 1987).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a right to abortion grounded in a Fourteenth
Amendment privacy right).
.11. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Oregon Chafes at Measure to Stop Assisted Suicides,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1999, at Al.
12. See id.
13. See Erin Hoover, Pain Medication Hastens SomePatients' Death, THE OREGO-
NIAN, Oct. 10, 1997, at Al.
14. See OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(2)(a) ("The people reserve to themselves the initi-
ative power, which is to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and enact
or reject them at an election independently of the Legislative Assembly.").
15. See Carol A. Pratt, Efforts To Legalize Physician-Assisted Suicide in New
York, Washington and Oregon: A Contrast Between Judicial and Initiative Approaches
- Who Should Decide?, 77 OR. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (1998).
16. See id.
17. See Physician Assisted Suicide: In the United States (last modified Oct. 31,
1999) <http://www.religioustolerance.org/euth-us.htm>.
18. See Hearings on H.R. 4006 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of John A. Kitzhaber, M.D.,
Governor of Oregon) [hereinafter Kitzhaber statement].
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the Act was to take effect, various doctors, patients and health fa-
cilities filed a class action suit complaining that the Act violated
their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process
rights, First Amendment free exercise of religion and free associa-
tion rights, and Americans with Disabilities Act rights. 9 The fed-
eral district court found that the Act violated the Equal Protection
Clause and on August 3, 1995, issued a permanent injunction
against its implementation. 20 This ruling was appealed. 21 Before
the Ninth Circuit could rule, however, the Oregon legislature
passed H.B. 2954-A repealing the 1994 statute on assisted suicide
and ordering a referendum on the issue.22 Opponents waged an
extensive campaign, spending close to four million dollars. 23 Sup-
porters of assisted suicide raised only $800,000 and were $300,000
in debt by the election. 24 On November 4, 1997, Oregonians re-
jected the referendum asking them to repeal the Death with Dig-
nity Act by a margin of sixty percent to forty percent and the
measure became effective.25
The next day, at the request of two conservative members of
Congress, Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry Hyde, a
Federal Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") administra-
tor wrote a policy statement threatening to charge any doctor par-
ticipating in the Oregon Act with a violation of the CSA.26 Later,
in June 1998, Attorney General Janet Reno would issue her ruling
nullifying the DEA policy,27 stating that drug laws had not been
intended "to assign DEA the novel role of resolving the earnest
and profound debate about the morality, legality and practicality of
physician-assisted suicide. '28 Meanwhile, in February 1997, the
Ninth Circuit decided that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the plain-
tiff's earlier constitutional claims and dismissed the complaint.29 In
October, prior to the November 1997 referendum, Federal District
19. See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994).
20. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995).
21. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 927
(1997).
22. See Kitzhaber statement, supra note 18.
23. See Physician Assisted Suicide in the United States, supra note 17.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See THE OREGON REPORT ON THE RIGHT TO DIE (Oregon Death with Dignity
Legal Defense and Education Center, Portland, Or.), Spring/Summer 1998, at 4.
27. See id.
28. Reno Letter, supra note 1.
29. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 927
(1997).
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Judge Michael Hogan vacated the injunction placed in 1994 on
Measure 16.30 Physician-assisted suicide was now legal in Oregon.
1. Provisions of the Death with Dignity Act
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act allows a mentally capable
Oregon adult resident to make a written request for medication
that can be used to end his life if physicians have determined that
he is suffering from a terminal disease (defined as having six
months to live), and he has voluntarily expressed a wish to die.3'
The Act was amended on June 30, 1999 by state Senate Bill 491,
which makes subtle, but significant, changes.32 The Senate Bill,
which was passed with strong bipartisan support, represented a col-
laborative effort by disparate groups that had originally opposed or
supported the Act.33
The amended Act has many safeguards. First, it states that no
person qualifies under these provisions simply because of age or
disability.34 Second, unlike the original Act, the amended Act de-
fines "capable. ' '35 A person is capable if either a court, his doctor,
a consulting physician, psychiatrist or psychologist finds that the
patient can make and communicate health care decisions to health
care providers.36 Third, a written request to the patient's doctor
must have been preceded by two oral requests, separated in time
by at least fifteen days.37 The written request must be witnessed, in
the patient's presence, by at least two people who attest that they
believe the patient to be competent and acting voluntarily.38 At
least one of these witnesses must not be (1) a relative by blood,
marriage, or adoption, (2) a future heir, (3) the owner, operator or
employee of a health facility treating the patient, and (4) the pa-
tient's physician.39
The amended Act has other provisions to try to ensure that pa-
tients are making well thought out decisions. If a patient requests
help with dying, a physician must determine that the patient has a
30. See THE OREGON REPORT ON THE RIGHT TO DIE (Oregon Death with Dignity
Legal Defense and Education Center, Portland, Or.), Fall/Winter 1997, at 1.
31. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800(2.01) (Supp. 1998).
32. See S. 491 (Or. 1999).
33. See THE OREGON REPORT ON THE RIGHT TO DIE (Oregon Death with Dignity
Legal Defense and Education Center, Portland, Or.), Spring/Summer 1999, at 1.
34. See 1999 Or. Laws 423 § 127.805(2.01)(2).
35. See id. § 127.800(1.01)(3).
36. See id.
37. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.840(3.06) (Supp. 1998).
38. See id. § 127.810(2.02)(1).
39. See id. (2.02)(2)(a)-(c), (3).
2000] 1743
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
terminal illness, is competent and has made the request volunta-
rily.40 The doctor must discuss the following subjects with the pa-
tient: diagnosis and prognosis; risks of taking the medication to be
prescribed; and feasible alternatives, such as hospice care and pain
control.41 The patient must be referred to a consulting physician
who confirms the diagnosis and agrees that the patient is capable
and acting voluntarily.42 If the doctor or consulting physician be-
lieves that the patient is suffering from a mental disorder or de-
pression, she must refer the patient for counseling. 43 The amended
Act defines counseling as "one or more consultations as necessary
between a state-licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and a patient"
to determine that the patient is capable and not suffering from a
disorder or depression impairing judgment. 44 "No medication to
end a patient's life in a humane and dignified manner" can be pre-
scribed as long as a patient suffers from a disorder that impairs
judgment.45
The amended Act recommends that the patient be counseled
about the importance of having someone else present when the
medication is taken.46 The patient must be informed that he can
rescind the request at any time, and the doctor should reiterate this
offer at the end of the fifteen day waiting period.47 The amended
law suggests two options for giving medication. First, the doctor
can dispense medicines directly to minimize patient discomfort,
provided he is registered with the Board of Examiners as a dispens-
ing physician and has a current DEA certificate. 48 A second option
allows the physician, with the patient's written consent, to contact a
pharmacist to inform him of the prescription, and to deliver the
prescription personally or mail it to the pharmacy.49 In the latter
case, the pharmacist will give the medications either to the patient,
the doctor or an expressly identified third party.50 The doctor must
file copies of the dispensing record with the Oregon Health Divi-
sion, the state health department.51
40. See 1999 Or. Laws 423 § 127.815(3.01)(1).
41. See id. § 127.815(3.01)(1)(c)(A), (B), (C), (E).
42. See id. (3.01)(1)(d).
43. See id. § 127.825(3.03).
44. Id. § 127.800(1.01)(5).
45. Id. § 127.825(3.03).
46. See id. § 127.815(3.01)(1)(g).
47. See id. (3.01)(1)(h).
48. See id. (3.01)(1)(k)(A).
49. See id. (3.01)(1)(k)(B).
50. See id.
51. See id. § 127.865(3.11)(1)(b).
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Finally, the amended Act adds several provisions to satisfy insti-
tutions, such as hospitals, that do not wish to participate in assisted
suicide. These institutions may impose sanctions on staff who,
while acting in the course and scope of employment with the insti-
tution, violate an institutional policy against participating in physi-
cian-assisted suicide.52 A physician will neither be subject to civil
or criminal penalties or professional disciplinary actions for partici-
pating in physician-assisted suicide, nor be punished for refusing to
participate in the practice.53
2. Initial Outcomes After Implementation of the Death with
Dignity Act
The Oregon Health Division, published reports following the
first and second years of the Act's implementation.54 Epidemiolo-
gists collected information from doctors of patients who received
prescriptions of lethal medication in 1998. 55 The study found that
twenty-three people had received prescriptions; fifteen died after
ingesting medication; six died from their illnesses; and two were
still alive on January 1, 1999.56 The average age of the fifteen who
took medication was sixty-nine.57 Eight were male, all were white,
and twelve were high school graduates.5 8 Participants dispropor-
tionately appeared to be unmarried; thirteen were widowed, di-
vorced or never married.59 The researchers suggested, however,
that one must be cautious in assuming that the unmarried individu-
als were socially isolated.60 The report stated that patients who
chose assisted suicide were not disproportionately poor, unedu-
52. See id. § 127.885(4.01)(5).
53. See id. (4.01)(1), (2).
54. See Arthur E. Chin et. al., Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon-
The First Year's Experience, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 577 (1999); Amy Sullivan, Ph.D.,
M.P.H. et. al., Oregon's Death with Dignity Act. The Second Year's Experience, De-
partment of Human Services, Oregon Health Division, Center for Disease Prevention
and Epidemiology (Feb. 23, 2000) <http://www.ohd.hr.state.or.us/cdpe/chs/pas/ar-
index.htr>.
55. See Chin, supra note 54, at 578.
56. See id. The report listed 22 prescriptions written and 15 deaths. The report of
the second year corrected this figure to 23 prescriptions written and 16 deaths. In the
second year under the Act, twenty-seven patients with a median age of 71, the major-
ity of whom had terminal cancer, ended their lives by assisted death. See Sullivan,
supra note 54, at 3.
57. See Chin, supra note 54, at 580.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See Arthur E. Chin et. al., Letter to Editor, NEW ENG. J. MED. (visited Oct. 4,
1999) <http:// www.nejm.org/content/1999/0341/0003/0212.asp>.
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cated, uninsured, fearful of financial circumstances or lacking end
of life care.61 Interestingly, the majority placed significantly more
importance on autonomy and personal control, rather than pain, as
the factors motivating their decision to die.62
By the standards of supporters, the first year of experimentation
with assisted suicide had been a success,63 but for opponents, it did
nothing to lessen their resolve to oppose this Act. They decided to
mobilize on a federal level.
B. The House of Representatives Acts to Thwart the Death
with Dignity Act
Members of the House of Representatives responded to the
Death with Dignity Act by proposing legislation that would make
the Act virtually impossible to implement.
1. The Lethal Drug Abuse and Prevention Act
On June 5, 1998, the date of Janet Reno's letter permitting Ore-
gon doctors acting in compliance with state law to write lethal pre-
scriptions without fear of DEA investigation, Henry Hyde
proposed new legislation, the LDAP Act.6 Senator Don Nickles
introduced a companion bill in the Senate.65 In a statement before
the House, Hyde portrayed assisted suicide as a natural result of
the "culture of death" and of the "slippery slope" entered when the
Supreme Court "sanctified abortion [as a] preferred option. '66 He
characterized the bill as one that would prevent the killing of the
61. See Chin, supra note 54, at 582.
62. See id.
63. The second year could be characterized as a success by supporters as well. In
the second year, 33 prescriptions were written and 27 patients died (representing a
rate of six per ten thousand of all Oregon deaths) from ingesting the medication. The
median age of patients was 71, almost all were white, 12 were married and 16 were
male. Seventeen patients had end-stage cancer (representing a rate of twenty per ten
thousand of Oregon cancer deaths). All patients had health insurance and 21 were
receiving hospice care. Once again, according to reports by doctors and relatives,
patients' main concern was loss of autonomy. Patients' other most significant fears
were "decreasing ability to participate in activities that make life enjoyable," losing
bodily functions, and physical suffering. Sullivan, supra note 54, at 3, 10.
64. H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998).
65. See S. 2151, 105th Cong. (1998). Both bills followed in the wake of the As-
sisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 14403 (1997). That law
prohibits the use of federal funds to cause a patient's death. It received unanimous
Senate support and was approved by a vote of 398-16 in the House. President Clinton
signed it into law. See H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 5-6 (1999).
66. Hearings on H.R. 4006 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Judici-
ary Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Rep. Henry J. Hyde).
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"elderly, the infirm, the sick, the disabled," those who are "un-
wanted. ' 67 Senator Nickles spoke before the Senate on the need
for the legislation to reaffirm doctors' right to relieve pain while
clarifying that this right does not extend to assisted suicide.68 In his
opinion, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act places the DEA in a
position of regulating controlled substances for the purpose of as-
sisted suicide.69 It compels the DEA to follow two standards, one
in Oregon under which assisted suicide is a "legitimate medical
purpose" and a second in the rest of the country under which it is
not.7 0 This bill would remedy that situation and provide one
standard.7'
The LDAP Act sought to amend the CSA by clarifying that fed-
eral law prohibits a doctor from dispensing or distributing con-
trolled substances with the intention of causing a suicide.72 Under
the LDAP, the Attorney General would deny registration to pre-
scribe controlled substances to a doctor who had "intentionally dis-
pensed or distributed a controlled substance with a purpose of
causing, or assisting in causing, the suicide or euthanasia of any
individual .... "73 The Act would not apply to doctors prescribing
medications with the sole purpose of alleviating pain or discomfort
even if death should follow. 74 The burden would rest on the Attor-
ney General to prove by clear and convincing evidence a physi-
cian's intent to cause death.7 5 The Attorney General would create
a medical review board that could, at a doctor's request, review any
decision to deny, revoke or suspend registration. 6
Some believed that the LDAP Act would make doctors fear pre-
scribing adequate pain relief for suffering patients.7 7 Significantly,
it was opposed by the American Medical Association ("AMA")
and by more than forty medical groups. 78 This opposition was tell-
67. Id.
68. See Drugs, Dignity, and Death: Physician Assisted Suicide?: Hearings on S.
2151 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 7-14 (1998) (statement of Sen.
Don Nickles).
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998).
73. Id. § 2(b)(1)(B).
74. See id.
75. See id. § 2(c)(2).
76. See id.
77. See Pratt, supra note 15, at 1108.
78. See id. at 1107 n.434. The AMA viewed "expanding the DEA's authority in
this matter [as an] unacceptable federal intrusion over matters of state law regarding
the practice of medicine." Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998: Hearings on
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ing and, although H.R. 4006 was referred out of committee, the
House took no further action.79 Stating that it would be one of his
top priorities to counteract the "misguided ruling by the Attorney
General" and clarify that controlled substances could only be used
for legitimate medical purposes and not for assisted suicide, Sena-
tor Nickles vowed to revisit the issue in the next Congress.80
2. The Pain Relief Promotion Act
True to his word, Nickles introduced the PRPA in the Senate on
June 17, 1999,81 concurrently with Representative Henry Hyde who
introduced the bill in the House.82 In Nickles' view, the Act would
"respond to the Attorney General's challenge, by clarifying that
the intentional misuse of [controlled substances] to cause patients'
death is not authorized by Congress in any state nor has it ever
been. '83 Henry Hyde, writing for the majority of the House Judici-
ary Committee, stated that the Act is necessary to ensure that all
states will regard the use of controlled substances in assisted sui-
cide as "inconsistent with public health and safety [as it was re-
garded] prior to the Attorney General's 1998 ruling." 84 Although
agreeing that states are the "first line of defense" in monitoring
prescription drug use, he wrote that the federal government has an
obligation to step in if a state refuses to follow federal standards. 85
Congressional supporters wished to make a strong statement that
the CSA does not permit assisted suicide and also improves end of
H.R. 4006 Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution Committee of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (July 14, 1998) (statement of Thomas R. Reardon,
M.D.). Furthermore, the AMA stated that federal action was not needed since states
were already addressing the issue of assisted suicide and "state legislatures, through
the police powers . . . determine the scope of medical practice." Id. Making "the
DEA an arbiter of the practice of medicine" was "unacceptable." Id. In its initial
support of subsequent legislation, H.R. 2260, the AMA appeared to have rethought
these concerns. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
79. See 144 CONG. REC. H. 8083 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1998).
80. Senator Don Nickles, Nickles Pledges to Revisit Physician-Assisted Suicide Is-
sue Next Year (visited Feb. 3, 2000) <http://www.senate.gov/-nickles/legislative /re-
leases/suicid98.cfm>.
81. See Timeline, THE OREGONIAN, Sept. 8, 1999, at A8.
82. Nickles would be frustrated as his bill stalled in the Senate Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions Committee. See 199 U.S. S.B. 1272 (SN). (State Net Bill track-
ing). Henry Hyde would be rewarded with victory. See Robert Pear, House Backs
Ban on Using Medicine to Aid in Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at Al.
83. 145 CONG. REC. S14775 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999).
84. H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 11 (1999). Actually, 38 states prohibit assisted
suicide through statutes and six through common law. See id. at 4 n.11.
85. Id. at 12.
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life care by promoting pain control.86 Representative Tom Bliley,
writing for the House Commerce Committee, stressed the need for
the Attorney General to use uniform standards.87 He wrote that
Janet Reno's previous ruling improperly rendered federal law on
assisted suicide "subordinate to and a mere function of state law
and policy." 88
The PRPA differs significantly from its predecessor. It amends
Section 303 of the CSA by stating, for the first time, that "alleviat-
ing pain or discomfort in the usual course of professional practice is
a legitimate medical purpose for the dispensing, distributing or ad-
ministering of a controlled substance that is consistent with public
health and safety, even if the use of such a substance may increase
the risk of death."89 In direct response to Janet Reno's contention
that the CSA could not "override a state's determination as to
what constitutes legitimate medical practice in the absence of a
federal law prohibiting that practice," 90 the Act states that
"[n]othing in this section authorizes intentionally dispensing, dis-
tributing, or administering a controlled substance for the purpose
of causing death or assisting another person in causing death," and
further stipulates that "the Attorney General shall give no force
and effect to state law authorizing or permitting assisted suicide or
euthanasia." 91 Doctors violating the Act by using controlled sub-
stances for assisted suicide would lose their registration, have to
give up any controlled substances in stock, and be held criminally
liable.9 A doctor faces a twenty year mandatory minimum sen-
86. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. H10869 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of Rep.
John Linder); 145 CONG. REC. H10875 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Jerry Moran).
87. See H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 2, at 6 (1999).
88. Id. Federal law on assisted suicide, the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction
Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 14401 (1997), is not actually made subordinate to state law by
the Death with Dignity Act since Oregon complies with its provision not to use fed-
eral funds for assisted suicide.
89. H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. § 101(i)(1) (1999).
90. Reno Letter, supra note 1.
91. H.R. 2260 § 101(i)(1).
92. See H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 2, at 10 (1999). Speaking before the House on
the day of the vote on the PRPA, Representative Peter De Fazio of Oregon quoted
the Justice Department on the issue of criminal penalties:
By denying authorization under the Controlled Substances Act, H.R. 2260
would make it a Federal crime for a physician to dispense a controlled sub-
stance to aid a suicide. However, a physician who prescribes the controlled
substances most commonly used to aid a suicide, because he or she necessa-
rily intends death to result, or may have intended death to result, or should
have known that death should have resulted, would face a 20-year
mandatory minimum sentence in Federal prison.
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tence when death results from the distribution of a schedule II
substance.93
Next, the Act requires that law enforcement personnel be of-
fered education and training "on the necessary and legitimate use
of controlled substances in pain management and palliative care"
and on how, in their investigations, they "may accommodate such
use." 94 The Act also amends Title IX of the Public Health Service
Act95 by requiring the administrator to "develop and advance sci-
entific understanding of palliative care" and to distribute protocols
on pain management and palliative care to medical programs and
practitioners. 96 Finally, the Act allocates $5,000,000 for grants to
health profession schools, hospices or other organizations to edu-
cate and train health professionals in palliative care. 97
II. THE PRPA STIRS UP CONTROVERSY
Opponents of the PRPA have expressed many concerns that
highlight the controversial nature of the legislation. They fear the
legislation's effects on the quality of health care available to people
in pain, challenge a perceived intrusion into states' rights, and
question possible punitive effects of the PRPA on physicians. 98
A. General Reactions to the PRPA
Democrats on the Judiciary Committee, in an impassioned dis-
sent from the committee's majority report, raised both medical and
constitutional concerns. 99 Their major medical concern, one shared
by many doctors, was that the bill would inhibit adequate pain re-
lief, making doctors afraid to treat pain aggressively lest they come
to the notice of the DEA.100 Representative Steven Rothman, a
145 CONG. REC. H10872 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of Rep. Peter De Fazio).
93. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(i)(C) (1994). A schedule II substance is a drug ac-
cepted for medical use that a physician may prescribe under DEA licensure, but
which has a high potential for abuse. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2) (1994); see also
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 n.1 (1975).
94. H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. § 102(3) (1999).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 299 (1994).
96. H.R. 2260, § 906(a)(1), (2). Palliative care is defined as "active total care of
patients whose prognosis is limited due to progressive, far-advanced disease. The pur-
pose of such care is to alleviate pain and other distressing symptoms and to enhance
the quality of life, not to hasten or postpone death." Id. § 906 (b).
97. See id. § 754(a), (c)(2).
98. See infra § II(A), (B).
99. See H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 31-39.
100. See id. at 34-35. The dissenters quoted parts of a letter from William H. Good-
son, III, M.D., President of the San Francisco Medical Society, to Representative
Nancy Pelosi, Aug. 20, 1999:
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non-committee member and opponent of physician-assisted sui-
cide, spoke of doctors under-prescribing because of their present
fear of civil medical malpractice lawsuits. 10' He expressed concern
that an emphasis on criminal penalties would make doctors even
less eager to treat pain effectively. 2  Other members of Congress
feared the effect of federal agents "second-guessing" doctors and
intruding on the sensitive doctor-patient relationship.10 3
The response of supporters to this concern was rather surprising.
In essence, both Hyde'04 and Nickles'0 5 said that such worries were
unfounded because only a small number of Oregon doctors, rather
than doctors as a whole, would receive increased DEA scrutiny
under this Act. Representative Hyde's Judiciary Committee report
stated that in Oregon, the DEA would simply subpoena records of
those doctors who had prescribed medications for suicide and then
complied with Oregon's recording laws; other Oregon doctors
would have nothing to fear. 10 6 Similarly, the Commerce Commit-
tee wrote in its report on the costs of enforcing the Act that since
"the bill would affect only doctors in Oregon, the costs ... would
fall below the $100 million ... threshold.'10 7
Senator Nickles, speaking before the Senate, said that the Act
would not have a "chilling effect" on doctors because it would not
In an era when a concerted and long-overdue effort is being made to lessen
physicians' fears of prescribing appropriate amounts of medications for pain,
we do not need to send a frightening and mixed message of increased inves-
tigation, criminalization, and politicization of what should be a private mat-
ter between patients and their physicians.
Id. at 35. A more horrible prospect was raised by Assistant Attorney General Robert
Raben when he suggested that H.R. 2260 could make state-authorized suicides more
painful. "H.R. 2260's prohibitions would only reach controlled substances, which are
most often used as sedatives and not as the actual agents of death. As a result, H.R.
2260 might well result in physician assisted suicides that do not use sedatives and
pain-controlling substances that are accordingly more painful." Letter from Robert
Raben, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legislative
Affairs, to Henry Hyde, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 19, 1999)
(on file with the author).
101. See 145 CONG. REC. H10870 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Steven Rothman).
102. See id. "Patient" has the Latin root patior, meaning "to endure pain or suffer-
ing." Ben A. Rich, A Prescription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for
Pain Management, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 28 (2000). "To note this ... is merely
to highlight the persistent ambivalence of the medical profession toward pain and
suffering as an aspect of the experience of illness." Id.
103. 145 CONG. REC. H10870.
104. See H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 13.
105. See 145 CONG. REc. S14775-776 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 13.
107. H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 2, at 10 (1999).
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"increase [by] one iota the authority of the DEA to investigate the
misuse of controlled substances to assist suicide outside of Ore-
gon." 108 The DEA would simply subpoena and look at records re-
quired by Oregon law so there would be "no question of murky
intentions or ambiguity."' 1 9 Even Oregon doctors would not have
to fear increased scrutiny if they were only prescribing medications
for pain relief."0 Nickles expected the DEA to follow its "long-
standing practice of generally deferring to state authorities" on
these issues."' The Act could only benefit the vast majority of
doctors by providing "a more explicit 'safe harbor' for the practice
of pain control.""112
Scientist David Joranson, testifying before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution, commented on how extraordi-
nary he found it that Congress would "single out States with con-
troversial policies on important societal issues, issues
nevertheless within their authority, and then, because there is an
(albeit tenuous) relation to the use of controlled substances, amend
the CSA to contravene the policy of that State. 11 3 Mr. Joranson's
perception of the motives of at least some representatives was
borne out by the comments of Representative Ron Paul of Texas
before the House when he said "[T]he Pain Relief Promotion Act
of 1999... is designed for one purpose. It is to repeal the State of
Oregon's law dealing with assisted suicide and euthanasia. '' 1 4
Opponents of the legislation also raised federalism concerns.
First, they saw this bill as a violation of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion encouraging states to experiment with resolutions to the issue
of physician-assisted suicide." 5 Viewing the motives of sponsors of
H.R. 2260 as primarily to "nullify an Oregon referendum," they
found them counter to a fundamental aspect of federalism, "that
the States are free to act as independent laboratories of democ-
108. 145 CONG. REC. S14775-776 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999).
109. Id. at 14775.
110. See id. at 14776.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Hearings on H.R. 2260 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Judici-
ary Comm. 106th Cong. 1999 WL 427145 (F.D.C.H.) (July 24, 1999) (testimony of
David E. Joranson, Senior Scientist and Director of the Pain & Policy Studies Group
at the Comprehensive Cancer Center at the University of Wisconsin) [hereinafter
Joranson testimony].
114. 145 CONG. REC. H10870 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of Rep. Ron
Paul). Representative Paul supported this goal but not this bill.
115. See H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 32-33 (1999).
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racy. 11 6 Responding to Henry Hyde's call for uniform national
standards, Representative Barney Frank stated that "[t]he exis-
tence of a right of assisted suicide in Oregon has no effect in Mas-
sachusetts or Oklahoma or Washington State .... [b]ut clearly the
need for uniformity simply reflects a desire of people here to im-
pose their moral views on the people of Oregon who have been
found to be morally deficient in this particular regard.""' 7 The
Washington Post noted federalism concerns with the PRPA in an
editorial:
Federalism is only meaningful if members of Congress exercise
restraint even when they disagree with state policies. To argue
that states should be free to experiment with policy only when
their experiments reflect a national democratic consensus-
rather than the preferences of their own populations-is really
to argue that the states themselves are only nominally more
than administrative districts of the national government." 8
Even Representative Ron Paul, who is strongly against abortion
and physician-assisted suicide, took issue with the Act because, like
Roe v. Wade, it attempted to find a national solution to an issue
that should be handled by states.11 9 He expressed fear that the ulti-
mate result could be disastrous for pro-life forces.120 "[T]here is
nothing to say that once we further establish this principle, that the
federal government ... will be used to repeal the very laws that
exist in 49 states ... that prohibit euthanasia. "121 He expressed the
danger of "[introducing] the notion that our federal congresses and
our federal courts have the wisdom to tell all the states how to
achieve the goals of protecting life and liberty."' 122
In a letter to Henry Hyde, Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney
General of the Department of Justice, decried the heavy handed
interference with state policy that would "effectively preclude
States from adopting ...[even] carefully drafted provisions de-
signed to protect the terminally ill.' 23 Raben wrote, "When an
issue turns solely on ethics, not science, it is reasonable to allow
individual states to reach their own conclusions, rather than impose
116. Id. at 32
117. Id.
118. Editorial, The Assisted Suicide Ban, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1999, at A26.
119. See 145 CONG. Rac. H10869-10870 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Ron Paul).
120, See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Raben, supra note 100.
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a uniform national standard through implied preemption of state
medical standards.' 124
Supporters responded that federalism was not at issue. "I have
long been a strong advocate of states' rights and the limited role of
the federal government," Senator Nickles told the Senate Judiciary
Committee when discussing the original LDAP Act.125 He went on
to explain that the legislation simply clarifies that longstanding fed-
eral law does not allow the use of controlled substances for assisted
suicide. 126
The Democrats in dissent complained further that this bill was
more punitive than H.R. 4006; the PRPA could impose criminal
penalties on doctors whereas its predecessor only revoked doctors'
licenses.127 They disagreed with proponents' contention that this
Act would not lead to criminal liability by noting that amendments
proposed by Democrats to modify the Act were rejected along
strict party lines. 28 For example, when Representative Howard
Berman suggested an amendment to remove criminal penalties
from the Act, it was rejected. 129 The majority also rejected two
amendments proposed by Representative John Conyers that would
have required the government to prove a doctor's intention to
cause death and also would have allowed an affirmative defense of
no intent.131 The dissenters expressed concern that the only lan-
guage permitting doctors to give pain relief, even if it has the unin-
tended consequence of causing death, appears in the Act's
introduction and is not "written in an operative manner. "131 The
language could "leave physicians exposed to penalties 'even if their
subjective intent was to provide palliative care."132 The minority
on the Commerce Committee lamented the lack of subcommittee
124. Id.
125. Pain Management and End of Life Care: Hearing on S. 1272 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Sen. Don Nickles).
126. See id.
127. See H.R. REP No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 34-35 (1999).
128. See id. at 35.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 37.
131. Id. at 36. The dissenters believe that the language of intent stated in the intro-
duction to the PRPA only states the bill's purpose but does not compel prosecutors to
abide by any set standard. Id. at 36-37. They argued that "the weight of legal author-
ity supports the view that the bill may result in strict liability for physicians... [leav-
ing doctors] exposed to penalties[,]" regardless of whether their only intention was to
provide pain relief. Id. at 37.
132. Id. at 37 (quoting fromLetter from Nicholas W. van Aelstyn, Heller Ehrman
White & McAuliffe, to the Honorable Ron Wyden (D-Or.), U.S. Senator (July 21,
1999)).
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hearings or markup of the bill on such a complicated and contro-
versial issue.1 33 They decried the prospect of DEA agents second-
guessing doctors and suggested that the Act would make doctors
afraid to prescribe sufficient pain medication, thereby increasing
suicides by patients unable to bear their pain.
13 4
Supporters denied that the PRPA would expand the investiga-
tory or enforcement powers of the DEA.135 They believed that it
would only reinforce powers already present and allow doctors to
use pain medications effectively. "[W]e are drawing a clear line of
distinction there that gives the physician the guidance they need, it
takes the discretion away from a DEA agent, and it follows the
same path that we have handled in our cases under the Controlled
Substances Act for decades and decades," Representative Asa
Hutchinson of Arkansas said on the floor of the House. 36
Opponents agreed that the Act would reinforce powers already
present and concluded that the Act is redundant. They suggested
that the legislation was unnecessary to insure adequate pain relief
because the law137 clearly states that "[t]his section is not intended
to impose any limitation on a physician ... to administer or dis-
pense narcotic drugs to persons with intractable pain in which no
relief or cure is possible. ' 138 In its 1974 regulations and again in its
1990 Physicians' Manual, the DEA had clarified that doctors may
prescribe opioids for intractable pain.139 They urged support for
133. See H.R. REP. No. 378, pt. 2, at 17 (1999).
134. See id.
135. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REc. H10874 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Bart Stupak; statement of Rep. Asa Hutchinson).
136. Id. at H10874 (statement of Rep. Asa Hutchinson).
137. 21 CFR § 1306.07 (1999) (discussing the administering or dispensing of nar-
cotic drugs).
138. 21 CFR § 1306.07(c) (1999).
139. See Joranson testimony, supra note 113. The 1990 DEA Physician's Manual
states that
[c]ontrolled substances and, in particular, narcotic analgesics, may be used in
the treatment of pain experienced by a patient with a terminal illness or
chronic disorder. These drugs have a legitimate clinical use and the physi-
cian should not hesitate to prescribe, dispense or administer them when they
are indicated for a legitimate medical purpose.
DEA Physician's Manual at 21 cited in letter from John A. Gilbert, Jr., Attorney,
Hymen, Phelps & McNamara, to James A. Guest, Executive Director, American Pain
Foundation (Oct. 20, 1999) (on file with author).
The AMA Code of Medical Ethics also already advises doctors that "[plhysicians
have an obligation to relieve pain and suffering and to promote the dignity and auton-
omy of dying patients in their care. This includes providing effective palliative treat-
ment even though it may foreseeably hasten death." Rich, supra note 102, at 35
(quoting American Medical Association, Code of Medical Ethics 40 (1996)).
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other legislation such as the Advance Planning and Comprehensive
Care Act of 1999140 or the Conquering Pain Act of 1999,141 both of
which concern palliative care but not assisted suicide.
B. Physicians' Reactions to the PRPA
The PRPA stirred up immediate controversy among doctors as
well. The AMA, which opposed the LDAP Act, initially supported
H.R. 2260 but subsequently experienced dissent among mem-
bers. 42 Medical groups lined up on both sides of this issue. In
addition to the AMA, supporters included the National Hospice
Organization, American Academy of Pain Management, American
Association of Anesthesiologists, and the Catholic Health Associa-
tion.143 Opponents included the Oregon Medical Association, the
American Alliance of Cancer Pain Initiatives, American Pain
Foundation, American Academy of Family Physicians and the Ore-
gon Hospice Association.'44 Dr. Yank Coble, representing the
AMA, expressed support of the PRPA because: it acknowledges
that adequate pain relief may cause death (the principle of the
"double effect"), provides for coordination of systems of pain man-
agement, funds education in palliative care, and opposes physician-
assisted suicide. 145 In addition, the AMA believes that the bill pro-
vides new protection for physicians who provide aggressive pain
140. See S. 628, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill, proposed by Senator Rockefeller on
March 16, 1999 to amend the Social Security Act, would develop standards to assess
end of life care, expand advance directives, provide a hotline for end of life decision-
making, and provide Medicare coverage for self-administered medications for chronic
pain amongst other goals.
141. See S. 941, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill, proposed by Senator Ron Wyden on
May 3, 1999 to amend the Public Health Service Act, would set guidelines for treat-
ment of pain, for quality improvement and for improved palliative care. It would pro-
vide education programs on pain management and study reimbursement barriers to
adequate pain relief.
142. See H.R. REP. No. 106-378 pt. 1, at 2 n.1 (1999). In December 1999, the AMA
House of Delegates asked its parent body to lobby to eliminate those parts of the bill
that would allow DEA agents to second-guess doctors and impose criminal sanctions.
President Reardon expressed optimism that a compromise could be worked out with
Senator Nickles such as allowing state medical societies to be part of the process. See
Mark O'Keefe, AMA Seeks Major Changes in Pain Bill, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 9,
1999, at Al.
143. See H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 2 n.1.
144. See id. at 32.
145. Pain Management and End of Life Care: Hearings on S. 1272 Before the
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of the Senate, 106th Cong. (Oct. 13,
1999) (statement of Yank D. Coble, M.D., member, AMA).
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relief at the end of life, thus reducing a physician's chance of being
criminally prosecuted for a legitimate medical practice. 46
Opponents noted the problems inherent in the concept of the
DEA interpreting a physician's intent. In a letter to Senator
Wyden, an attorney wrote:
[T]his notion of intent, and the unclear manner in which it is
used in S. 1272, creates troubles for physicians in all states,
whether or not they plan to engage in physician-assisted suicide.
Legally, intent is considered to be established where there is
knowledge that the death is substantially certain to occur as a
result of the conduct; however, intent also can be found where
death should have been reasonably expected to occur as a result
of the conduct. The PRPA would mandate that the criminal
process resolve those difficult subjective questions after the
fact. 14
7
Opponents note that a physician thus could be liable even if he
merely should have known the dosage he administered was le-
thal.' 48 The DEA would be compelled to make difficult judgments
it might prefer not to make. The DEA Deputy Administrator has
acknowledged that there is no consensus among doctors regarding
the appropriate use of controlled substances in the treatment of
intractable pain, which puts the "DEA ... in a difficult position,
for it is asked to determine the appropriate prescribing practices in
the treatment area in which the medical profession is not in accord
... [It] is not the DEA's role to resolve this disagreement. It
remains the role of treating physicians to make medical decisions
",149
Ultimately, on October 28, 1999, the House passed the Pain Re-
lief Promotion Act of 1999 by a vote of 271-156.151 Oregonians
were angered. The New York Times reported one day after the
PRPA passed that Oregon congressional members, including those
who had voted against the Death with Dignity Act twice, were
united in their determination to stop this bill from becoming law.151
Senator Ron Wyden, an opponent of assisted suicide, said he
146. American Medical Association's position on the "Pain Relief Promotion Act of
1999" (visited Mar. 4, 2000) <http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/basic/article/0,1059,199-
483-1,00.html>.
147. Letter from Nicholas W. van Aelstyn, Attorney, Heller Ehrman White & Mc-
Auliffe, to Senator Ron Wyden (Oct. 1, 1999) (on file with author).
148. See id.
149. 64 Fed. Reg. 25,073, 25079 (1999).
150. See Pear, supra note 82.
151. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Oregon Chafes at Measure to Stop Assisted Suicide,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1999, at Al.
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would filibuster if the bill reached the Senate floor. 152 On January
24, 2000, he notified the minority leader that he had placed a hold
on H.R. 2260.153 Governor Kitzhaber said he would explore possi-
ble legal challenges if the PRPA becomes law. 154 Thus, it is likely
that opponents of the PRPA will challenge the amendment in the
Supreme Court if it is passed by the Senate in the next Congress
and signed into law.
HIL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO
THE PRPA
In advance of Section IV, which will evaluate the PRPA in light
of constitutional provisions, this section reviews recent U.S. Su-
preme Court rulings that may influence its holdings. In addition, it
examines constitutional grants or limitations of power that may
have an impact on the constitutional discussion. Finally, it consid-
ers the concept of provisional adjudication that might provide a
prudent rationale for postponing final resolution of this issue.
A. The Supreme Court Rules on Assisted Suicide
In 1997, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
two state laws that made physician-assisted suicide illegal.15 5 The
Court, while finding no constitutional right to assisted suicide, sug-
gested in Washington v. Glucksberg56 that states and the demo-
cratic process have appropriate roles to play in forming policy on
this issue. 57
The Supreme Court upheld a statute forbidding assisted suicide
in Vacco v. Quill.'58 There, the question was whether New York
State's statute prohibiting assisted suicide violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'5 9 Respondents 6 '
claimed that although the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is
not distinguishable from the right to physician-assisted suicide, the
152. See id.
153. A "hold" means that he is asking to be notified if the bill reaches the Senate
floor, presumably because he would wish to be there to filibuster.
154. See Verhovek, supra note 151.
155. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S.
702 (1997).
156. 521 U.S. 702.
157. See id. at 716.
158. See Quill, 521 U.S. at 809.
159. See id. at 796.
160. Respondents were three practicing physicians who would have prescribed le-
thal medications to competent, terminally ill patients but for the statute, and three
patients who had died by the time of the decision. See id. at 797.
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law treats these choices differently. 161 They contended that this
disparity violates the Equal Protection Clause.162 The Court re-
jected the lower court's conclusion that withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment is essentially assisted suicide. 63 In the Court's
opinion, a patient who refuses life-sustaining treatment may not
intend death, even though he dies from his underlying disease,
whereas a person ingesting lethal drugs intends to die and is killed,
not by disease, but by medication.164 Furthermore, a doctor who
withdraws treatment. at a patient's request intends only to follow
the patient's wishes and to cease futile care, whereas a doctor who
assists a suicide "must, necessarily and indubitably, intend prima-
rily that the patient be made dead. ' 161 The Court also saw no par-
allel between providing palliative care to someone who then dies
more quickly (the so called "double effect") and physician-assisted
suicide.166 Since the Court found New York's decision to ban as-
sisted suicide in order to preserve life, prevent suicide, protect vul-
nerable people and avoid a possible slide towards euthanasia
legitimate, 67 the Court found the statute constitutional.
In a second case, Washington v. Glucksberg, respondents were
physicians who treated terminally ill patients and who declared
that they would help some patients die were it not for the Washing-
ton ban on assisted suicide.' 68 The Court unanimously ruled that
Washington's law did not violate the Constitution, and five justices
joined in the opinion of the Court written by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist.16 9 Rehnquist found that although the nation has moved from
161. See id. at 798.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 800-01. In a contrasting view, in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, Justice Scalia, who voted with the majority in Glucksberg and Quill, argued
that refusing treatment which results in death is suicide. 497 U.S. 261, 296 (1990).
"Starving oneself to death is no different from putting a gun to one's temple as far as
the common-law definition of suicide is concerned; the cause of death in both cases is
the suicide's conscious decision to 'put an end to his own existence."' Id. at 296-97
(citations omitted).
165. Quill, 521 U.S. at 801-02.
166. See id. at 807 n.11.
167. See id. at 808-09.
168. See id. at 707. They were joined by three terminally ill patients who had died
by the time the Court heard arguments and by the organization Compassion in Dying.
See id. at 707-08.
169. See id. at 704. For Chief Justice Rehnquist, this issue may have held special
significance because of his wife's death in 1991 after a protracted fight with ovarian
cancer. Also, Justice Breyer's wife counseled terminally ill children and their parents
at a cancer institute at the time of the case. See PETER FILENE, IN THE ARMS OF
OTHERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO DIE IN AMERICA 199 (1998).
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a punitive stance on suicide to one of greater understanding, it has
retained a strong condemnation of assisted suicide.170 Though the
Court had previously read the liberty interest of the Due Process
Clause to include the right to protection against government ac-
tions in matters of family and personal privacy, the Court hesitated
to extend these rights to this issue, one that more properly should
be part of "the arena of public debate and legislative action. 171
Chief Justice Rehnquist found that Washington's ban was ration-
ally related to legitimate government interests in preserving human
life, preventing suicide, protecting the integrity and ethics of doc-
tors, protecting vulnerable groups who might be coerced into
choosing suicide, and preventing a slide down the "slippery slope"
towards voluntary or involuntary euthanasia. 7 The ban on as-
sisted suicide was found not to violate the Fourteenth Amendment
on its face or as applied to competent terminally ill patients. 73 The
Court wrote that since "Americans are engaged in an earnest and
profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of
physician-assisted suicide," this holding will allow the "debate to
continue, as it should in a democratic society. "174
Thus, while finding no constitutional right to physician-assisted
suicide, Justice Rehnquist urged that the debate on assisted suicide
continue in our democratic society. Justice O'Connor (joined by
Justice Ginsberg and Justice Breyer, in part) 75 and Justice Sou-
ter 176 deferred to the states to explore this issue further, and Justice
170. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-719.
171. Id. at 720.
172. Id. at 733 n.23.
173. See id. at 735. Justice Rehnquist agreed with Justice Stevens that another
plaintiff might prevail in a more particularized challenge, but said the claim would
have to differ greatly from that of Glucksberg. See id. at 735 n.24.
174. Id. at 735.
175. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor, made the point that, in New York and
Washington, any terminally ill patient suffering great pain can obtain medication le-
gally from a doctor to relieve his suffering even though unconsciousness or death may
ensue. See id. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, to avoid the "slippery slope"
dangers, the Court should not rule assisted suicide constitutional. See id. at 737. She
agreed that this issue should be left to the democratic processes and the "laboratory
of the States." Id.
176. Justice Souter concurred in the judgment of the Court for two reasons. First,
he argues that the state had a powerful enough interest in protecting vulnerable peo-
ple and in preventing the potential slide into legal euthanasia to defeat the respon-
dents' claim. See id. at 782-83 (Souter, J., concurring). Second, he reasoned that state
legislatures are the appropriate forum for consideration of this issue. See id. at 788.
Souter wrote that "[t]he experimentation that should be out of the question in consti-
tutional adjudication displacing legislative judgments is entirely proper, as well as
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Stevens suggested that a ban on assisted suicide might fail in some
particular circumstances. 177
B. Federalism and the Court
1. A Federalist Court
A majority of the justices on the current Supreme Court have
shown a strong commitment to the federalist principle of protect-
ing state sovereignty, which may influence how they view the im-
pact of the PRPA on Oregon's law. The Framers, who believed
that "freedom was enhanced by the creation of two governments,
not one, '178 forged a system wherein power would be shared by the
federal and state governments. As they fashioned a new form of
government, the Framers determined that "[t]he powers delegated
by the proposed Constitution to the federal government [would be]
few and defined" whereas the states' powers would be "numerous
and indefinite.' 79 While the federal government would be con-
cerned with such issues as "war, peace, negotiations and foreign
commerce," the states could control issues concerning "the lives,
liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, im-
provement and prosperity of the State.' i8 0
Ideally, in allocating power to the federal government or to the
states, the analysis would center on which arrangement could result
in the most effective government. 18' For example, the national
government is likely to be better at defense, foreign policy, trade,
large-scale transportation infrastructure such as interstate high-
ways, and national currency.' 82 It has the power to make laws that
can control negative externalities that one state may impose on an-
highly desirable, when the legislative power addresses an emerging issue like assisted
suicide." Id. at 789.
177. Justice Stevens, although joining the opinion, appeared to favor physician-as-
sisted suicide in some circumstances and foresaw that a mentally competent person
seeking assisted suicide might "prevail in a more particularized challenge." Id. at 741,
750 (Stevens, J., concurring). He wrote that some state intrusions on people's deci-
sions on how to die are intolerable. See id. at 745. Stevens saw "no absolute right to
physician-assisted suicide" but believed that people who are near death should be
able to decide "how ... a critical threshold [that is, the threshold to death] shall be
crossed." Id. The state's interests will not have the same force when a patient is
terminally ill. See id. at 745-46.
178. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995).
179. FEDERALIST No. 45 at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
180. Id.
181. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis,
13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 960 (1997).
182. See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers":
In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 780, 787 (1995).
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other through its activities.1 8 3 Furthermore, the federal govern-
ment can protect unpopular minorities, whereas a homogeneous
state government might be unwilling to act. 184
States, on the other hand, can meet the particular needs of their
constituents. Chief Justice Rehnquist has written of the traditional
services that states provide their citizens, such as "fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recrea-
tion." '185 Professor Steven Calabresi has noted that the United
States has four major and distinct regions, (the Northeast, the Mid-
west, the South and the West), each of which "vote[s] very differ-
ently... and... disagree[s] on matters of religion, culture, and to
some extent, on race and ethnicity." 186 The "libertarian" West may
favor policies such as physician-assisted suicide that are abhorrent
to the "religious, more culturally conservative" South.187 Acting
on their distinctive cultural, social and political mores, states can
experiment with new ideas that may ultimately influence their
neighbors. In 1932, Justice Brandeis stated that "[i]t is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel so-
cial and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try.' 1 88 Seconding this value of federalism, Justice O'Connor has
noted that women's suffrage, begun in Wyoming in 1890, preceded
national suffrage by thirty years189 and that unemployment insur-
ance, minimum wage laws for women and minors, and no-fault au-
tomobile insurance all began as state initiatives.'9 °I No doubt other
experiments were tried and abandoned but at no risk to the nation
at large.
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor has cautioned that "[c]itizens...
cannot learn the lessons of self-government if their local efforts are
devoted to reviewing proposals formulated by a faraway national
legislature . . . . [C]itizens must retain the power to govern, not
merely administer, their local problems."19' The Court's federalists
183. See id. at 781.
184. See id. at 784.
185. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
186. Calabresi, supra note 182, at 766.
187. Id. at 767.
188. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 386-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
189. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
190. See id. at 788-89.
191. Id. at 790.
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seek to "zealously protect [the] distinctions" between state and
federal power lest we "[upset] the balance of power that buttresses
our basic liberties. ' 192 Responding to an increase in federal crimes,
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that
[t]he trend to federalize crimes that traditionally have been han-
dled in state courts.., threatens to change entirely the nature of
our federal system. The pressure in Congress to appear respon-
sive to every highly publicized societal ill ... needs to be bal-
anced with an inquiry into whether ... we want most of our
legal relationships decided at the national rather than local
level. 1
93
Thus, this Court weighs the balance of power between states and
the federal government with care and seeks to protect federalist
values. The Court has held at least twenty federal laws unconstitu-
tional since the 1994-1995 term 94 and has displayed a renewed em-
phasis on protecting state sovereignty. 195 This philosophy may
influence how the Court rules on the constitutionality of the PRPA.
192. Id.
193. William H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, 11
FED. SENT. R. 134 (Nov./Dec. 1998).
194. See The Committee on Federal Legislation, The New Federalism, 54 THE RE-
CORD (Association of the Bar of the City of New York) 712 (1999).
195. The Supreme Court has followed a pendulum's swing over the many years of
its judgments. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819), the Court
held the federal government supreme in power to the states when it allowed Congress
to charter a national bank and forbade Maryland to follow its practice of taxing banks
not chartered by the state. In 1824, Chief Justice Marshall gave broad powers to Con-
gress to legislate under the Commerce Clause, allowing it to legislate with respect to
all commercial intercourse that concerns more than one state. See Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 194 (1824).
The period from 1887-1937 is generally described as one in which the Court re-
versed direction and found much congressional action unauthorized by its Commerce
Clause power. Laurence Tribe points out, however, that the Court ruled against Con-
gress on only eight occasions. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 810 (3d ed. 2000). Nevertheless, these eight rulings had great impact. "Like the
proverbial sword of Damocles, they exert[ed] their influence simply by hanging over-
head and not falling." Id. The Court's construction of the term "commerce" was
narrow, allowing Congress to regulate trade, but not permitting it to regulate such
activities as mining or manufacturing even if the resulting products would enter inter-
state commerce. See id.
The pendulum swung again with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Here,
the Court found that Congress' power "extends to those activities intrastate which so
affect interstate commerce ... as to make regulation of them appropriate means to
the attainment of [Congress' granted interstate commerce power]." Id. at 118. The
Court ruled that the Tenth Amendment, which "states but a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered," offered no barrier to Congress' authority over in-
terstate commerce. Id. at 124. Following Darby, the Court continued to show defer-
ence to federal power until the present period of renewed federalism.
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2. The Rebirth of Tenth Amendment Rights
Although subsequently overruled, National League of Cities v.
Usery 9 6 marked the beginning of the Court's federalist revival af-
ter many years of deference to Congress. Writing for the Court,
Justice Rehnquist held that Congress could not, within its Article I
powers, "directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.' 1 97 Ac-
cordingly, the Court invalidated the 1974 Amendments to the Fed-
eral Labor Standards Act, which extended minimum wage and
hour laws to state municipal workers. 98 Permitting Congress to
dictate terms under which the State hired its workers, the Court
held, would intrude upon "integral governmental functions"199 and
make it harder for states to work effectively in a federal system . °°
Permitting Congress to prevent states from making "those funda-
mental employment decisions upon which their systems for per-
formance of [the traditional functions of state governments] must
rest ... we think there would be little left of the States' 'separate
and independent existence.' "201
National League of Cities was overturned by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,2 which found the previ-
ous "attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity
in terms of 'traditional government function' . . . unworkable
.... "203 Acknowledging the important place of states in the consti-
tutional system, the Court nevertheless believed that the political
system would "[ensure] that laws that unduly burden the states will
not be promulgated. 2 0 4 Justice Rehnquist may have been dis-
mayed by this ruling, but the confidence revealed in his dissent that
the Court would change its views again was soon vindicated. °5
Gregory v. Ashcroft2°6 signified the beginning of that change.20 7
Justice O'Connor began her opinion with a description of the val-
196. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
197. Id. at 852.
198. See id. at 837-38.
199. Id. at 851.
200. See id. at 852.
201. Id. at 851 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
202. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
203. Id. at 531.
204. Id. at 556.
205. See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
206. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
207. The issue in Gregory was whether Missouri was violating the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") by requiring state judges to retire at age
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ues of federalism, noting how a "healthy balance of power" be-
tween the federal government and the states could "reduce the risk
of tyranny" and how the Tenth Amendment permits States to "re-
tain substantial sovereign authority.." 20 8 "In the tension between
federal and state power," O'Connor contended, "lies the promise
of liberty. 20 9 The Court refused to read the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") as covering judges without a
clear statement from Congress to that effect. 210 Furthermore, the
Court ruled that if Congress intends to change the constitutional
balance between the federal government and the states, it must do
so with a clear statement of intent.211 Finding no such statement
within this Act, the Court decided that the ADEA could not super-
sede the Missouri law.212 The Court appeared to be returning to
the methodology of National League of Cities, defining areas of
state activity that Congress could not regulate.213 It began by reaf-
firming the importance of federalism, moved on to defining an area
that should remain within state control and then "erected the plain
statement rule to either completely protect or at least partially
shield this delineated area of state sovereignty from federal
regulation. '214
Federalism continued its recovery with New York v. United
States.215 The Court defined the issue as one of "discerning the
proper division of authority between the Federal Government and
seventy. See id. at 455-57. The ADEA included the states as employers but excluded
elected officials, personal staff of elected officials, appointees on the policymaking
level, or legal advisers from the term "employee." See 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1967).
208. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457-460. The Tenth Amendment states, "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
209. Id. at 459.
210. See id. at 467.
211. See id. at 460-61 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243
(1985)).
212. See id. at 473.
213. See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
1311, 1339 (1997). Over the years, the Court has moved between two interpretations
of the Tenth Amendment. Either it is seen as a reminder that Congress can act within
its express or implied authority and no law in Congress' power will be invalidated as
invading states' rights, or, as it appears in Gregory, the Tenth Amendment "reserves a
zone of activities to the states" which Congress may not enter even while exercising
its Article I power. Chemerinsky, supra note 181, at 971.
214. Yoo, supra note 213, at 1339.
215. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The case analyzed the constitutionality of the "take title"
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,
which compelled states that did not meet a deadline to develop plans for disposal of
low-level radioactive waste to take possession of the waste and become liable for any
damages it caused. See id. at 153 (describing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)).
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the States, [a] constitutional question ...as old as the Constitu-
tion.12 16 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, declared the
"take title" provision unconstitutional because it sought to "com-
pel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory pro-
gram. "217 In an interesting analysis of the Tenth Amendment,
Justice O'Connor explained that "Congress exercises its conferred
powers subject to [constitutional] limitations. '218 Although Con-
gress might legitimately regulate publishers under the Commerce
Clause, it could be limited in that power by the First Amend-
ment.219 Similarly, other powers granted to Congress by the Con-
stitution might be limited by the state sovereignty granted by the
Tenth Amendment.22 ° In New York, the Court determined that
"an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an
Article I power."22 1
In Printz v. United States,22z the Court reaffirmed that Congress
may not compel a state to "enact or enforce a federal regulatory
program," and extended the prohibition to direct "conscripting of
the States' officers. '223 Sheriffs challenged amendments to the
"Brady Bill" on Tenth Amendment grounds.224 The government
argued that it could ask state officials for limited assistance in en-
forcing federal law that regulates private conduct because the gov-
ernment would not be asking the states to make policy, as in New
York.225 Justice Scalia rejected the distinction between "'poli-
cymaking' and mere 'implementation"' as impossible to draw and
stated that "an imprecise barrier against federal intrusion upon
state authority is not likely to be an effective one. '226 Further-
more, Scalia contended that a state's independence and autonomy
is less undermined when it can make policy than when it is simply
compelled to follow federal directives. 2 7 In following a federal di-
216. Id. at 149.
217. Id. at 188.
218. Id. at 156.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 157.
221. Id.
222. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
223. Id. at 935. Amendments to the Federal Gun Control Act (commonly called the
"Brady Bill") temporarily required the chief law enforcement officer in local jurisdic-
tions to conduct background checks on people seeking to buy guns to insure that
potential purchaser did not fall into prohibited categories. See id. at 903.
224. See id. at 904-05.
225. See id. at 926-27.
226. Id. at 927-28.
227. See id.
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rective, states will also be "put in the position of taking the blame
for the directive's burdensomeness and defects. 228
Justice Stevens's dissent contended that the Commerce Clause in
conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause229 granted the
power to regulate the sale of guns and thus validated Congress'
right to legislate in the Brady Bill. Justice Scalia's majority opinion
offered the following analysis:
When a "[l]a[w] ... for carrying into Execution" the Commerce
Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the
various constitutional provisions we mentioned earlier ... it is
not a "[l]a[w] ... proper for carrying into Execution the Com-
merce Clause," and is thus, in the words of The Federalist,
"merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation" which "deserve[s] to be treated
as such.",2
30
Furthermore, Justice Scalia contended that because "numerous
constitutional provisions" reflect "our system of dual sovereignty
... [i]t is not at all unusual for our resolution of a significant consti-
tutional question to rest upon reasonable implications. '231
The Court has continued to render decisions that show a com-
mitment to protecting state sovereignty. 32 This trend may influ-
ence how the Court rules on the constitutionality of the PRPA.
228. Id. at 930.
229. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 18. "The Congress shall have the Power... To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego-
ing Powers . . . ." Id. Justice Stevens argued that such powers include regulation of
commerce in guns. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 941 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
230. Id. at 923-24 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton)). Scalia
cited the following constitutional provisions earlier in Printz: the Guarantee Clause;
the Tenth Amendment; the prohibition on involuntary reduction of a State's territory,
Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power Clause, Art III, § 2; the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, Art. IV, § 2, speaking of the "Citizens" of the States; and the amendment
provision, Article V. See id. at 919.
231. Id. at 923-24 n.13 (citations omitted).
232. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act, which required compelling state interests should the
government attempt to burden the exercise of religious rights. Congress cannot cre-
ate new constitutional rights, and its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
extend only to enforcing the rights already guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the Com-
merce Clause does not give Congress the power to override a State's immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment pre-
cludes suits of states in federal courts for their trademark infringements, and striking
down the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1122, which permitted
such suits); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (disallowing suit in state or federal
court for violations of provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),
which required the State to give its employees overtime pay).
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3. The Guarantee Clause and Federalism
The Guarantee Clause 233 provides another area for judicial re-
view in deciding the constitutionality of the PRPA. This Clause
provides that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government .... "234 The Guar-
antee Clause has been an integral part of federalism, allowing
states a federal guarantee to experiment with various forms of gov-
ernment.235 As Professor Deborah Jones Merritt suggested, states
can only have a republican form of government if the federal
branches permit them the autonomy to initiate and preserve their
own forms of government. 36
The Guarantee Clause has two principle aspects: states may not
adopt non-republican forms of government; and, if states adhere to
republican principles, the federal government may not act in ways
that would destroy this republican character.237 In tracing the his-
tory of the Clause, Merritt notes that "although the original im-
pulse behind the Clause might have been a desire to protect the
states from the dangers of aristocratic government or internal re-
bellion, the broad language of the Clause secured the states against
any threat to 'republican' government [including] intrusions by the
federal government. 2 38
Voter initiatives would seem to be a novel way for states to ex-
periment with their form of government. However, as soon as ini-
tiatives were introduced, they were attacked as not fitting a
republican form.239 Oregon's 1902 constitutional amendment per-
233. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
234. Id..
235. See William T. Mayton, Direct Democracy, Federalism & the Guarantee
Clause, 2 GREEN BAG 2D, 269, 270 (1999).
236. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federal-
ism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988).
237. See id. at 25. There are several valuable effects when states have their appro-
priate share of power under the federal system and are spared federal intrusion. First,
states can "check national power by serving as a wellspring of political force". Id. at
5. They can lobby the federal government, sue it or regulate in areas the federal
government has ignored. See id. at 5-6. Second, citizens can participate more readily
in state and local government. See id. at 6. This creates the secondary benefits of
training citizens in democracy, giving voters trust in the democratic system and com-
pelling local officials to be accountable. See id. Third, allocating power to states al-
lows different social and political climates to flourish in different communities. See id.
at 8. Finally, this allocation of power creates opportunities for the creation of new
ideas and programs as fifty states attempt to craft solutions for their individual press-
ing issues. See id. at 4.
238. Id. at 35.
239. See Mayton, supra note 235, at 273.
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mitting voter initiatives was tested in Kadderly v. City of Port-
land.24 ° The Oregon Supreme Court held that the amendment did
not violate the Guarantee Clause.241 "The people have simply re-
served to themselves a larger share of legislative power, but they
have not overthrown the republican form of the government, or
substituted another in its place. 242
Historically, the Guarantee Clause has not played a major part
in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court refused to rule in an
1849 Guarantee Clause case, Luther v. Borden,243 because the case
turned on "political rights and political questions. ' 244 Justice
O'Connor has complained that an initially "limited holding" by the
Court has "metamorphosed into the sweeping assertion" that vio-
lations of the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable.245 O'Connor
noted that the Court in Reynolds v. Sims suggested that some
Guarantee Clause claims are justiciable when it stated that "some
questions raised by the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable. ' 246
More recently, the Court has mentioned the Guarantee Clause as
relevant to the power of states to "determine the qualifications of
their most important government officials ' 247 and as indicative that
the states retain sovereignty and reserved rights.248
C. The Commerce Clause
1. United States v. Lopez
Article I, Section 8, of the Commerce Clause, allows Congress
"[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States. ' 249 As
noted previously, Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause
240. See 44 Or. 118 (1903).
241. See id. at 144.
242. Id. at 145.
243. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
244. Mayton, supra note 235, at 275. This was a case where conflicting groups each
attempted to establish themselves as the legitimate governments of Rhode Island.
One group, the Dorrites, eventually lost the contest and their leader, Dorr, was ar-
rested for treason by the group in power, the Charter government. See id. Several
years later, when the issue was basically moot, the Supreme Court was asked to rule
whether Dorr's arrest had been unlawful because, it was argued, his party had been
the legitimate governors of the state at the time of Dorr's arrest. See id. Thus the
Court had to decide if the Dorrites had established themselves as the rightful state
government under the Guarantee Clause. See id. The court refused to rule on this
issue. See id.
245. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184 (1992).
246. Id. at 185 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964)).
247. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991).
248. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 917 (1997).
249. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
2000] 1769
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
have waxed and vaned.250 In United States v. Lopez,251 a case with
great import in evaluating the constitutionality of the PRPA, the
Court reined in Congress' greatly expanded Commerce Clause
powers.252 Lopez was a twelfth grade student who had been ar-
rested on school premises carrying a handgun and bullets.253 State
charges for firearm possession on school premises were dismissed
after federal agents charged Lopez under the Gun Free School
Zones Act of 1990 ("GFSZA"). 254 This Act made it a federal of-
fense for a person "knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that
the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone."
255
The District Court found Lopez guilty, but the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress had exceeded
its powers under the Commerce Clause.256 The Supreme Court af-
firmed.257 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist began
with a statement, "[w]e start with the first principles," and contin-
ued with a description of the benefits of federalism and the judicial
history of the Commerce Clause. 258 He determined that Congress
has the right to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, and also "those activities having a substantial rela-
tion to interstate commerce. ' 259 The Court found that the GFSZA
regulated activity that was neither part of commerce nor an "essen-
tial part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated. ' 260 Nor did the statute contain a jurisdictional ele-
ment to ensure thorough analysis of each case that the firearm pos-
session in question actually affected interstate commerce. 261 By
criminalizing conduct already criminalized by most states and in-
fringing on an area in which states have primary authority, Con-
gress was disturbing a sensitive balance between federal and state
250. See supra note 195.
251. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
252. See id. at 561.
253. See id. at 551.
254. See id.
255. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)(A)(Supp. V 1988).
256. See id. at 552.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 552-562.
259. Id. at 558-59.
260. Id. at 561.
261. See id.
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power.2 62 Gun possession could not be considered an economic ac-
tivity affecting interstate commerce even if many people possessed
guns. 263 "To uphold the Government's contentions here," Rehn-
quist continued, "we would have to pile inference upon inference
in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States. ' 2 6
The following two principles emerge from Lopez: (1) Congres-
sional power is limited and extends only to those activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce;265 and (2) the Court will be
less deferential when reviewing congressional powers than it has
been in the past, subjecting them to a stronger rational basis stan-
dard.266 Congress may not "use a relatively trivial impact on com-
merce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private
activities. ' 267 The Court found that two types of laws substantially
affect interstate commerce: those that regulate an intrastate com-
mercial activity that substantially affects interstate commerce when
viewed in the aggregate; and those that "include a jurisdictional
element allowing 'case by case inquiry' to ensure that specific ap-
plications of the law do in fact substantially affect interstate com-
merce." 268 One can also distinguish Lopez by the following factors
which may not often arise in Commerce Clause cases: Congress
was entering two spheres traditionally left to the states, education
and crime; it was legislating a national solution where none was
needed; and it was regulating an activity that had only a tenuous
connection to interstate commerce.269
262. See id. at n.3. Responding to the government's contention that violent crime
has negative effects on education, travel and commerce, the Court stated that
"[u]nder the [Government's] theories ... it is difficult to perceive any limitation on
federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where
States historically have been sovereign." Id. at 564.
263. See id. at 567.
264. Id. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy also found no evident commercial
nexus in the statute and criticized it for preventing State experimentation in an area
of traditional state concern "to which States lay claim by right of history and exper-
tise." Id. at 583.
265. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 677 (1995).
266. See id.
267. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27
(1968)).
268. Douglas W. Kmiec, Is the Violence Against Women Act a Valid Exercise of
Congressional Power?, 4 PREVIEW 210 (Dec. 20, 1999).
269. David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez
and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59, 107 (1997). The particu-
lar circumstances of Lopez may explain why there have been few lower court deci-
sions limiting Congressional Commerce Clause action. The most significant reliance
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Professor Deborah Jones Merritt has designed a series of criteria
to help determine if an activity is more likely to be considered in-
terstate commerce by the Court.2 70 An activity is more likely to be
interstate commerce if it is commercial or economic, if it falls in an
area where national regulation is needed, and if it is connected to
the workplace and concerns employer-employee conduct.27 1 An
activity is less likely to be interstate commerce, and thus not within
Congress' authority to regulate, if it concerns an area, like educa-
tion, that is traditionally regulated by the states, if it regulates pri-
vate property, if it seeks to regulate a crime already punishable by
state law, or if it appears to so broadly grant congressional power
that permitting this law would allow congressional regulation of all
sorts of conduct.272 Furthermore, if the statute in question fails to
provide a jurisdictional element that links the activity to interstate
commerce and lacks explicit congressional findings connecting the
law to commerce, the Court is less likely to find that the statute
on Lopez has been Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ.,169 F.3d
820 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 60 U.S. L.W. 3175 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 99-5, 99-29).
The Fourth Circuit found that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause
to pass § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-322
§§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (1994). This section was one part of a mul-
tifaceted federal response to crimes of violence against women and created "a private
cause of action against any 'person ... who commits a crime of violence motivated by
gender,"' allowing the victim "to obtain compensatory damages, punitive damages,
and injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate relief." Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 827.
In 1995, Christy Brzonkala filed a case under this section against two male students
at her college, alleging that they had forcibly raped her in a dormitory room and then
made coarse public statements indicating gender animus. See id. Applying Lopez,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that § 13981 concerned crimes that arise
from gender hatred, "a type of crime relatively unlikely to have any economic charac-
ter at all." Id. at 834. Nor would such crimes in the aggregate substantially affect
interstate commerce. See id. The court said that "the federal patchwork of antidis-
criminatory laws can hardly be characterized as a single, interdependent regulatory
scheme aimed at commercial or economic activity." Id. Like the Court in Lopez, the
Fourth Circuit refused to extend federal protection to traditional areas of state con-
trol. See id. at 844. Even if Congress was responding to a failure by states to act in
this area of criminal law, Congress erred by providing a remedy against criminals
rather than one against states. See id. at 842. By doing so, Congress "encroached
upon the States' ability to determine when and how violent crime will be punished...
[and] blurred the boundary between federal and state responsibility for the deter-
rence and punishment of such crime." Id. Shortly before this Note went to press, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's ruling in a five to four majority opinion
that strongly reaffirmed the Lopez analysis of the Commerce Clause powers. See
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
270. See Deborah Jones Merritt, supra note 265, at 746.
271. See id.
272. See id.
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regulates interstate commerce.2 73 Finally, if competition among
states will probably lead to positive outcomes on a particular legal
issue, the Court will find that federal legislation is not required or
permitted.274 Merritt explains that national legislation may be
needed when competition between states causes each to lower its
standards in a 'race to the bottom,' but is not needed when states
are competing to attract citizens, either by offering services and
laws desired by the public at large, or by offering "progressive reg-
ulations that appeal to some segments of the citizenry. 275
2. The Commerce Clause and Drug Regulation
Of interest in this Note is how Congress' Commerce Clause pow-
ers relate to its right to regulate those drugs that might be pre-
scribed by a doctor in assisting a suicide.
a. Congress' History of Drug Regulation
Congress has shown an active interest in drug regulation for
more than ninety years. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906,
which forbade the interstate shipment of adulterated or mislabeled
food and drugs, represented Congress' first attempt to regulate the
sale and distribution of drugs it considered dangerous. 76 Subse-
quently, in 1914, Congress passed the Harrison Act277 and in 1922,
the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act,278 two initiatives in-
tended to regulate addictive drug consumption which remained in
place until 1970. The enactment of fifty laws since 1914 regulating
narcotics and dangerous drugs had led to a "confusing and often
duplicative approach" to the regulation of legitimate drugs and
control of the illegal drug trade.279 Noting that the country's
problems with illicit drug use had worsened, Congress favored the
creation of one piece of legislation which could unite existing laws
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. Id. at 706-07 (quoting William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Laws: Re-
flections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974)).
276. See ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938).
277. See ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970).
278. See ch. 9, 38 Stat. 275 (repealed 1970).
279. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444 (1970). The Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 defined mari-
juana as a controlled substance; it was followed by other anti-drug laws such as the
Opium Poppy Control Act, the Narcotic Manufacturing Act of 1960, and the 1965
amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act which targeted halluci-
nogens, barbiturates, and tranquilizers. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief-
The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 1135, 1149 (1995).
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and court rulings into one instrument. 280 Both statutes were re-
pealed in 1970 and replaced with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, also known as the Controlled
Substances Act ("CSA").281
The CSA requires every person who manufactures, distributes or
dispenses any controlled substance to register with the United
States Attorney General so as to obtain authority to continue his
work.282 Anyone who unlawfully manufactures, distributes, dis-
penses or possesses controlled substances is subject to criminal
penalties that include imprisonment, fines or both. 3 A registered
physician, however, may lawfully give a patient a prescription for a
controlled substance if the medical purpose is legitimate, and if he
is acting "in the usual course of his professional practice. '' 284 The
responsibility for correctly prescribing and dispensing drugs lies
with the practitioner.285
280. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444 (1970).
281. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1970). The principal purpose of the CSA was to
counter a "growing menace of drug abuse" through a three-pronged approach of pre-
vention and rehabilitation, strengthened law enforcement for abuse prevention and
control and balanced penalties for drug crimes. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1444. The law
was intended primarily to counter drug abuse, particularly the use of drugs for their
"stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system." Reno
Letter, supra note 1 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 811(f)). Congress believed that "[f]ederal
control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to
the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic." 21 U.S.C. § 801(6)
(1970). It intended the CSA to create a "'closed' system of drug distribution for legit-
imate handlers of such drugs" to counter the widespread diversion of prescription
drugs into 'illicit channels."' H.R. REP. No. 91-1444. The House Report noted that in
1965, it was estimated that half of the nine billion amphetamines and barbiturates
produced legally in the United States found their way to the illegal market. See id.
The CSA created five categories of controlled substances ranked according to their
abuse potential as well as accepted medical use. See Brickey, supra note 279, at 1149.
282. See 21 U.S.C. § 822.
283. See id. at § 841(a)-(b).
284. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (1974).
285. See id. It has been argued that the war on drugs has made doctors reluctant to
prescribe opioids and has provided a significant barrier to adequate palliative care.
See Rich, supra note 102, at 43. Doctors fear that their patients may become addicted
and furthermore, fear that even if the DEA finds no irregularities in their prescribing
practices, state medical licensing boards, "many... themselves afflicted with the same
prejudices, fears, myths, and misinformation about the use of narcotics for pain relief
as those they regulate" will censure their actions as unprofessional. Id. at 48, 54.
While prior to 1999 there had been no disciplinary action against a physician for
inadequate provision of pain relief, there had been many accusations of over-prescrib-
ing analgesics. See id. at 58. In 1999, the Oregon Medical Board censured a physician
for allowing six patients to suffer pain unnecessarily. See Erin Hoover Barnett, Case
marks big shift in pain policy, THE OREGONIAN, Sept. 2, 1999 at Al. Although pain
can be relieved in 90% of cases, there is evidence that 80% of patients do not receive
adequate pain relief. See Rich at 39 n.219 (citing Betty R. Ferrell & Michelle Rhiner,
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Doctors who violate the Controlled Substances Act can incur
penalties as severe as those imposed on drug dealers. In United
States v. Moore,286 a physician was convicted of "knowing and un-
lawful distribution and dispensation of methadone" because he had
prescribed large doses of methadone to patients, charging them ac-
cording to the number of pills prescribed, and providing inade-
quate physical examinations or other appropriate medical care.287
The Supreme Court overturned a lower court holding that regis-
tered physicians, because of their status as registrants, could be
subject only to sections of the law carrying lower penalties28 8 and
could not be liable under § 841(a)(1) of the Controlled Substances
Act, a section carrying the most severe penalties.289 As is typical in
cases where physicians are convicted under the CSA, the Court
viewed Moore as a "large scale 'pusher' not as a physician. "290
b. The Right of Congress to Regulate Drugs Under the
Commerce Clause
Shortly after Congress enacted the CSA, several federal court
cases tested the Act's constitutionality.29' In two cases relating
specifically to physicians, defendants contended that the Act vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment.2 9 2  In United States v. Collier,293 a
physician authorized to dispense controlled substances was con-
victed of illegally distributing methadone "while not acting in the
High-Tech Comfort: Ethical Issues in Cancer Pain Management for the 1990's, 2 J.
CLIN. ETHICS 108, 108 (1991)).
286. 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
287. Id. at 125.
288. See id. at 128. The Court of Appeals believed that doctors could only be sub-
ject to §§ 842 and 843. See id. Section 842 makes it unlawful for a "registrant to
distribute a controlled substance.... " Id. at 129 n.5. The penalty is at most one year
imprisonment and/or a fine of $25,000. See id. at 129 n.6. Section 843 makes it unlaw-
ful for a registrant knowingly and intentionally to distribute a schedule I or II sub-
stance in the course of his legitimate business "except pursuant to an order or an
order form .... " Id. at 129 n.5. The penalty for violation is a maximum of four year
imprisonment and/or a fine of not more than $30,000. See id. at 129 n.6. Section 841
(a) (1) makes it illegal for "'any person' knowingly or intentionally to distribute or
dispense a controlled substance except as authorized by the CSA." Id. at 122. By
contrast, violations of § 841 carry a maximum sentence of fifteen years and/or a fine
of up to $25,000. See id. at 129 n.6.
289. See id. at 131.
290. Id. at 143.
291. See United States v. Lopez, 459 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Scales, 464 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031
(1975).
292. See Collier, 478 F.2d at 272; Rosenberg, 515 F.2d at 198.
293. 478 F.2d 268.
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usual course of his professional practice. ,294 Dr. Collier contended
that the statute, by invading states' residual police powers295 to
control the practice of medicine,296 violated the Tenth Amend-
ment.2 97 The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim. The court held that
the Tenth Amendment did not apply when Congress was exercising
its rightful power under the Commerce Clause.298 Under the CSA,
Congress was permissibly regulating drugs which, when uncon-
trolled, could pass freely from state to state through illegitimate
channels.299 Congress, therefore, had a responsibility to insure that
doctors who have legitimate access to drugs did not divert them to
the illicit market.3°°
In United States v. Rosenberg,3 1 Dr. Rosenberg appealed his
conviction on twenty-seven counts of unlawful distribution, not in
the course of professional practice, of a controlled substance.3 °2
The seventy-five year old doctor had sold prescriptions for Dex-
edrine, Seconal, and Miltown to several undercover federal
agents.30 3 The court noted that the federal government had to reg-
ulate the legitimate channels of the intrastate market to control
interstate incidents of drug trafficking.3° Quoting United States v.
Darby, °5 the court noted that the Tenth Amendment does not pre-
vent Congress from "resort[ing] to all means for the exercise of a
294. Id. at 270.
295. "Police power" refers to "[a]n authority conferred by the American constitu-
tional system in the Tenth Amendment ... upon the individual states.., through
which they are enabled to... secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health and
prosperity of its citizens .... " BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990).
296. In Linder v. United States, the Court stated that "[o]bviously, direct control of
medical practice in the states is beyond the power of the federal government." 268
U.S. 5, 18 (1925). States are authorized to regulate medicine by setting up licensing
boards and may determine the qualifications of who may practice medicine in the
state. See Peckman v. Thompson, 745 F. Supp. 1388, 1391 (C.D. Ill. 1990); see also
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (deferring to state medical licensing
laws and stating that the "nature and extent of the qualifications required [to practice
medicine] must depend primarily upon the judgment of the state as to their
necessity").
297. See Collier, 478 F.2d at 272.
298. See id. This interpretation differs from the one apparently favored by the pre-
sent Supreme Court that the Tenth Amendment "reserves a zone of activities to the
states" that Congress may not enter even while exercising its Article I powers. See
Chemerinsky, supra note 181.
299. See Collier, 478 F.2d at 273.
300. See id.
301. See 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975).
302. See id. at 191.
303. See id. at 192 n.1.
304. See id. at 194.
305. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
1776
PAIN RELIEF PROMOTION ACT
granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the
permitted end."3 °6 The court found the statute constitutional.30 7
Courts have continued to reaffirm Congress' Commerce Clause
power to regulate controlled substances in several cases which fol-
lowed United States v. Lopez.3"8
D. Equal Protection Amendment Challenge
The Fifth Amendment is another provision that applies to the
constitutionality of the PRPA. It prescribes that "[n]o person shall
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. '30 9 Although the Amendment does not mention equal protec-
tion specifically as is the case with the Fourteenth Amendment,310
it has been understood to encompass equal protection.311 In its
simplest terms, the Amendment guarantees that people who are
similarly situated will be treated similarly.312 A challenge under
the Fourteenth Amendment would center on whether the PRPA
might have the inadvertent effect of making pain care less accessi-
ble to some. The challenge would be based on a right hinted at by
the Court in Washington v. Glucksberg313-the right to adequate
pain relief at life's end.314 Justice O'Connor appears to suggest that
there may be a constitutional right for terminally ill patients who
are suffering pain at the end of their lives to receive palliative
care.315 Justice Breyer has written that "were state laws to prevent
the provision of palliative care, including the administration of
drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of life-then the law's
306. See Rosenberg, 515 F.2d at 198. The Darby vision of the federal/state balance
of power differs from the views of the present Court. See Chemerinsky, supra note
181.
307. See Rosenberg, 515 F.2d at 198.
308. See, e.g., United States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333 (2d Cir. 1996). There, a cocaine
dealer who sold drugs interstate, challenged the CSA as exceeding Congress' com-
merce power authority. See id. at 1334. The court stated that Congress could regulate
intrastate drug sales because this obviously economic activity, combined with like ac-
tivity, affects interstate commerce. See id. at 1335, 1337. The court wrote that "be-
cause narcotics trafficking represents a type of activity that Congress reasonably
found substantially affected interstate commerce, the actual effect that each drug con-
spiracy has on interstate commerce is constitutionally irrelevant." Id. at 1336.
309. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
310. See id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person.., the equal
protection of the laws.")
311. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 93 (1976).
312. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1438 (2d ed. 1988).
313. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
314. See id. at 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
315. See id.
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impact upon serious and otherwise unavoidable physical pain (ac-
companying death) would be more directly at issue. '31 6 Justice
Stevens wrote that "ensuring the availability of adequate pain
treatment is of utmost importance. 3 17
E. Provisional Adjudication
Professor Michael Dorf advocates for provisional adjudication
when the Court is confronted with complex issues, such as assisted
suicide, that are addressed differently in different states.318 Provi-
sional adjudication refers to a practice of postponing decision-mak-
ing or making a provisional decision until an issue has "ripened. '319
Dorf posits that since five justices in Glucksberg and Quill seemed
to believe that they might find a right to assisted suicide in a prop-
erly framed future case, "[it] is thus reasonable to suppose that the
possibility of state experimentation was a critical factor in the
Court's rejection of" this right in the cases it judged.320
Assuming that Congress could, under its Commerce Clause
power, legitimately outlaw lethal prescriptions and thus endanger a
State's ability to experiment with assisted suicide, Dorf suggests
that this separation between "the jurisprudence of congressional
power and the jurisprudence of individual rights" may lead to
wrong solutions. 321 Rather, the Court should supplement federal
jurisprudence with rights jurisprudence. "When ... the possibility
of experimentation by the states plays a substantial role in the pro-
visional decision to deny recognition to a right, the Court ought to
limit the federal government's ability to adopt a uniform national
solution before there has been a substantial period for experimen-
tation. '32 2 Although the Court has, since Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,323 striven for uniform application of federal law, the Court
has also deferred judgment on some novel issues so that they can
316. Id. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
317. Id. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring).
318. Michael C. Dorf, Foreward: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 60-63 (1998).
319. See id. at 65.
320. Id. at 62-63.
321. Id. at 63.
322. Id. at 64.
323. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816) (stating the "necessity of uniformity in decisions
throughout the whole United States on all subjects within the purview of the constitu-
tion" and claiming that "deplorable" "public mischief" would result if the Court could
not "control these jarring and discordant judgments and harmonize them into uni-
formity"). Id. at 347-48.
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"percolate. '324 There are, in fact, several occasions on which mem-
bers of the Court denied certiorari or made statements based on
the conviction that some issues deserve a period of experimenta-
tion before the Court can make final judgments.325 Thus, prece-
dent exists to delay judgment on controversial issues like assisted
suicide.
This section has reviewed aspects of the Tenth Amendment, the
Guarantee Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Fifth Amend-
ment, as well as the concept of provisional adjudication, all of
which are relevant in evaluating the constitutionality of the PRPA.
Section IV analyzes the PRPA in light of these provisions.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD FIND THE
PRPA UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A. Application of federalist principles under the Tenth
Amendment and the Guarantee Clause
Ironically, the natural supporters of physician-assisted suicide,
people on the "Left," traditionally have been advocates of strong
federal government legislation on such social concerns as abortion,
gun control or violence against women. Perhaps recalling the role
of states' rights in the oppression of black citizens, they fear a re-
turn to federalism.
Equally ironically, those who are usually strong supporters of
states' rights-people on the "Right" on many social issues-favor
federal law opposing physician-assisted suicide. Supporters of as-
sisted suicide may need to shed their aversion to federalist posi-
tions and argue that, in our highly heterogeneous society, some
divisive social, cultural and religious issues require state experi-
mentation. It is not inconsistent to favor federal abortion rights
but to oppose federal legislation that precludes assisted suicide. A
324. Dorf, supra note 318, at 65.
325. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("We have in many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems are
presented, periods of 'percolation' in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal
appellate courts may yield a better informed and more enduring final pronouncement
by this Court."); Smith v. Robbins, - U.S -, 120 S. Ct. 746, 758-59 (2000) (stating that
"it is more in keeping with our status as a court, and particularly with our status as a
court in a federal system, to avoid imposing a single solution on the States from the
top down .... We will not cavalierly 'imped[e] the States' ability to serve as laborato-
ries for testing solutions to novel legal problems."'); McCray v. New York, 461 U.S.
961, 963 (1983) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) ("In my judgment it is a
sound exercise of discretion for the Court to allow the various States to serve as labo-
ratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this
Court.").
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federal right to abortion grants choice: no one is compelled to avail
herself of this right and no one is precluded from defining her own
destiny as it relates to pregnancy. By contrast, a federal ban on
assisted suicide would eliminated choice for people who live in
states that allow terminally ill people to have some say in the man-
ner of their deaths. Thus, there are good reasons for supporters of
physician-assisted suicide to favor analysis of the PRPA under fed-
eralist principles.
A federalist analysis would center on finding the correct balance
of power between the federal government and the states, as well as
on specific constitutional provisions such as the Tenth Amendment
and the Guarantee Clause.
. 1. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment states, "the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. '326
The Court vacillates between two interpretations of the Tenth
Amendment: reading it as a reminder that Congress can act within
its express or implied authority so that no law in Congress' power
will be invalidated as invading states' rights; or finding that the
Tenth Amendment "reserves a zone of activities to the states" and
protects this zone from congressional regulation.32 7 The majority
on the present Supreme Court appears to favor the latter reading
as more consistent with federalist principles. Although National
League of Cities v. Usery328 was overturned, it provided then Jus-
tice Rehnquist with the opportunity to express his belief that there
are "areas of traditional government function" (including regula-
tion of public health) that a state can direct without federal govern-
ment intervention.32 9 Similarly, in Gregory v. Ashcroft,33 ° the
Court appeared to be returning to the methodology of Usery, de-
fining areas of state activity that Congress could not regulate. 331
Applying Gregory, the Court might find that regulation of public
health and doctors' medical practice is a state function that falls
within states' police powers. States already monitor doctors
through state medical boards.332 The State of Oregon has chosen
326. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
327. Chemerinsky, supra note 213.
328. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
329. Id. at 852.
330. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
331. See supra notes 213-214 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 296.
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to define assisted suicide as part of the normative practice of
medicine within its borders. It has created regulations and proce-
dures to monitor physician-assisted suicide. The Court might de-
cide that the federal government should not override the decision-
making power of the state in this area. In New York v. United
States, 333 Justice O'Connor wrote that a state's Tenth Amendment
rights to sovereignty could supersede Article I powers granted to
Congress. 334 Justice Scalia, in Printz v. United States, 335 stated that
even a law enacted by Congress under Commerce Clause powers
may be void if it violates the right of states to sovereignty widely
alluded to in several clauses of the Constitution.336 Thus, even
though Congress has the general power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate doctors' prescribing of controlled substances,
the right of the State of Oregon to sovereignty may supersede Con-
gress' power in this narrow instance.
More recent Tenth Amendment cases concern whether the fed-
eral government can compel states or state officials to enact policy
or administer federal programs.337 The PRPA does not appear to
require that the states help the federal government implement its
new regulations. If the PRPA requires state officials to perform
some of the work of the DEA, the court may find a Tenth Amend-
ment violation. Justice Scalia rejected the government's argument
in Printz that state officials could be asked for limited help in en-
forcing federal laws that regulate private conduct because the fed-
eral government would not be compelling state governments to
make policy in such an instance.338 He believed that it would be
difficult to draw a distinction between policymaking and imple-
mentation and that states, acting without choice or authority in the
matter, would nevertheless be blamed by their constituents for any
negative consequences of the regulation.339 This lack of choice and
authority would threaten their sovereignty.34 °
Finally, Justice O'Connor noted an additional limitation on con-
gressional power when she wrote of the plain statement rule in
333. 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
334. See id. at 156-57 (1992).
335. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
336. See id. at 923-24 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 33 at 204 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
337. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
338. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 927.
339. See id. at 928, 930.
340. See id. at 928.
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Gregory.34" The Court stated that if Congress intends to change
the constitutional balance between the federal and state govern-
ments, it must make this intention clear with a plain statement.342
It can be argued that the PRPA's statement that "the Attorney
General shall give no force and effect to State law authorizing or
permitting assisted suicide or euthanasia '34 3 is such a plain state-
ment. Conversely, this statement can be seen as vague rather than
clear notice that Congress intends to enter the arena of regulation
of medical practice generally allocated to the states. If interpreted
that way, this Act would violate the plain statement rule.
2. The Guarantee Clause
The Guarantee Clause allows states to experiment with various
forms of republican government.344 Professor Deborah Jones Mer-
ritt has explained that the clause has two elements: (1) states may
not adopt non-republican forms of government; and (2) once states
have chosen a republican form of government, the federal govern-
ment may not sabotage the states' choice.345 By preventing federal
intrusion into state governance choices, the Guarantee Clause be-
comes an integral part of federalism. 346
Recently, the Court has recognized the power of the Guarantee
Clause to protect state sovereignty.347 Voter initiatives, such as the
one that introduced the Death with Dignity Act to Oregon voters,
were first acknowledged as a legitimate way to experiment with a
republican form of government in Oregon348 and have become
common in several states. Voter initiatives can get voters directly
and enthusiastically involved in self-governance, a goal that Justice
O'Connor has praised.349 Conversely, in Oregon, where voters
have twice expressed their desire to experiment with a new social
policy, through voter initiative and then referendum, and now face
the prospect of having their will thwarted by national representa-
tives who disagree with their policy choice, citizen involvement in
the democratic process is likely to fade. Naturally, if voters choose
341. See 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
342. See id. at 473.
343. H.R. 2260 § 101, 106th Cong. (1999).
344. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
347. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 919 (1997).
348. See Kadderly v. City of Portland, 74 P. 710 (Or. 1903).
349. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 790
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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to approve an unconstitutional law through a voter initiative pro-
posal, the Court would be correct in overturning that proposal. °
That, however, is not the case with Oregon's assisted suicide law.
The Supreme Court has not made a judgment that a law allowing
physician-assisted suicide is unconstitutional; rather it has decided
that states are not violating the Constitution when they ban as-
sisted suicide since the right to choose the manner of one's death is
not a fundamental right.
In examining a Guarantee Clause claim relating to the PRPA,
the court might adopt a narrow view, contending that there is no
violation of the Guarantee Clause because Oregonians retain the
right to voter initiatives whether the PRPA stands or falls. In fact,
the Death with Dignity Act would still stand on the books under
the PRPA even if it would become most difficult to implement with
the elimination of the use of controlled substances. Nevertheless, a
more functional analysis, exploring how best to apportion power to
promote democracy, might find that although the voter initiative
would remain a right available to Oregonians, it would become a
hollow right if citizens' knew their votes could be overturned by
Congress. The assisted suicide right that would remain would not
be the right sixty percent of Oregonian voters chose. Chilling vot-
ers' enthusiasm to take an active part in decisions that affect their
community cannot advance the causes of federalism or democracy.
Similarly, when a state has chosen the voter initiative as a form of
republican government, its right to "retain substantial sovereign
authority" '351 is damaged if the results of an initiative are treated as
insignificant. As the Washington Post noted, "[t]o argue that states
should be free to experiment with policy only when their experi-
ments reflect a national democratic consensus-rather than the
preferences of their own populations-is really to argue that the
states themselves are only nominally more than administrative dis-
tricts of the national government. ' '352
B. The PRPA and the Commerce Clause
In an effort to stop the "Death with Dignity" movement before
it gained momentum, congressional opponents of physician-as-
350. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that no legitimate state
interest was served by a Colorado constitutional amendment, approved by state refer-
endum, that would have prevented the state or any of its cities from giving certain
protections to homosexuals and finding the amendment unconstitutional).
351. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461 (1991).
352. See Editorial, The Assisted-Suicide Ban, WASH. POST., Nov. 1, 1999, at A26.
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sisted suicide had two choices: to draft national legislation outlaw-
ing assisted suicide or to tack an amendment weakening the right
to assisted suicide onto legislation already recognized as regulating
in an area of legitimate congressional power. Opponents may have
hesitated to do the former, because the Supreme Court had stated
quite explicitly that it wished debate to continue on this issue and
several justices had expressed a preference for state-by-state reso-
lution of the controversy.353 Therefore, amending the CSA was
preferable because the regulation of controlled substances has long
been recognized as falling within Congress' Commerce Clause
powers.354 Because Congress wanted to counter the widespread di-
version of prescription drugs into illicit channels,355 and because
drugs travel interstate in trade, Congress was within its rights to
"regulate [this] commerce among the several states. 3 56 Cases fol-
lowing United States v. Lopez357 continued to support Congress'
right to regulate in this area.358
Several principles emerge from Lopez, however, that suggest
that Congress has overstepped its Commerce Clause powers in
drafting this legislation. Professor Deborah Jones Merritt's criteria
on evaluating whether an activity is likely to be interstate com-
merce 359 provide an excellent platform from which to begin an
analysis. First, if an activity is commercial or economic, it is likely
to be interstate commerce and subject to congressional regulation.
In Lopez, mere possession of a firearm, even in the aggregate, was
not deemed to be a commercial activity.36 ° In the context of the
CSA, drugs that are bought and sold and enter the illicit drug mar-
ket are part of commercial activity. Prescription drugs that travel
from manufacturers to pharmacies to doctors and finally to pa-
tients are also part of commerce. Accordingly, Congress and the
Court rationally can conclude that assisted suicide prescriptions af-
fect interstate commerce and Congress can regulate in this area.
The PRPA would thus be constitutional under the Commerce
Clause. A more complex analysis of the issues at stake here sug-
gests an alternate conclusion, however, which this Note will ex-
amine after further exploration of Merritt's criteria.
353. See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text.
354. See supra Part III.C.
355. See supra note 281 and accompany text.
356. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
357. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
358. See supra note 308.
359. See supra notes 271-275 and accompanying text.
360. See 514 U.S. at 567.
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Merritt's second criterion is that, to be "interstate commerce,"
an activity must fall within an area where national regulations are
needed.36' In Lopez, the Court was being asked to override state
decisions in two areas traditionally left to the states, education and
362 Te'"'crime. The Court believed that the federal government would
upset a sensitive balance between state and federal powers by
criminalizing conduct already criminal in most states. 36 3 In the
area of physician-assisted suicide, thirty-eight states already pro-
hibit assisted suicide through statute and six more prohibit it
through common law.36 Whether the Court would find national
regulation of assisted suicide necessary would turn on whether it
would find that the country needs one national standard on this
issue. By noting that their holding would allow the "debate to con-
tinue, as it should in a democratic society" on the "morality, legal-
ity and practicality of physician-assisted suicide,"365 the Court in
Washington v. Glucksberg appeared to reject one universal, na-
tional solution. If the PRPA is providing one national standard
when none is needed, it is less likely to fall under Congress' right to
regulate interstate commerce.
Third, if an activity is connected to workplace employer-em-
ployee conduct, it is considered interstate commerce. 366 Although
the gun in Lopez was brought onto school premises-a work-
place-possession of that gun did not relate to employer/employee
conduct. It is arguable whether a regulation of a doctor's intention
when he administers medication falls under this measure.
Fourth, according to Merritt, an activity is less likely to be com-
merce if it regulates an area traditionally left to the states,367 such
as schools or crime. Justice Kennedy criticized the government in
Lopez for preventing state experimentation in an area of tradi-
tional state concern claimed by "history and expertise. ' 368 The
PRPA, allying itself with the CSA and thus purporting to regulate
traffic in illegal drugs, is actually regulating physician medical deci-
sions. Medicine is traditionally an area of state regulation. As the
Court stated in Linder v. United States, 369 "[o]bviously direct con-
361. See Deborah Jones Merritt, supra note 265, at 746.
362. See Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 269, at 107.
363. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3.
364. See supra note 84.
365. 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
366. See Deborah Jones Merritt, supra note 265, at 746.
367. See Deborah Jones Merritt, supra note 265, at 746.
368. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583.
369. 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
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trol of medical practice in the states is beyond the power of the
federal government. '370 Nevertheless, the Court has allowed regu-
lation of doctor's behavior in the area of administering drugs. The
Supreme Court found prosecution of a doctor under the CSA
proper in United States v. Moore because the doctor was acting as a
"drug pusher."'37 1 Other cases where convictions of physicians
under the CSA were upheld all concerned doctors introducing
large quantities of narcotic drugs into the stream of commerce for
profit rather than because of medical necessity.372 Illicit drug traf-
fic is not at issue in the Oregon law, however. A doctor writing a
prescription for a terminally ill patient is not selling drugs for profit
in the manner proscribed in Moore. Oregon, through the voice of
its citizens, has chosen to define physician-assisted suicide as a nor-
mative aspect of professional medical practice. Medical practices
are regulated by state medical boards that license doctors and de-
termine appropriate medical standards.373 Such licensing and over-
seeing is not a federal function. Thus, the PRPA is less likely to be
regulating interstate commerce because it is attempting to regulate
a traditional state function.
Fifth, an activity is less likely to be interstate commerce if the
statute fails to provide a jurisdictional element that links the ele-
ment to interstate commerce.374 Had the statute in Lopez stated
that a gun that has traveled in interstate commerce may not be
possessed within a thousand feet of a school, the Court might have
upheld the statute. A statute is also less likely to be found as regu-
lating interstate commerce if it lacks explicit findings connecting
the law to commerce. The PRPA makes no jurisdictional state-
ment and has no findings, perhaps because the drafters believed
the amendment could rest on the findings of its parent statute. The
Court should require findings as well as an explicit jurisdictional
element tying particular prescriptions to interstate commerce.
Next, an activity is less likely to be interstate commerce if com-
petition among states on this issue will probably lead to positive
outcomes rather than a race to lower standards.375 Regulation is
not needed when states are offering progressive laws that appeal to
some segments of the citizenry, leading them to wish to live in that
370. Id.
371. 423 U.S. 122, 143 (1975).
372. See supra notes 292-307 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 296.
374. See Deborah Jones Merritt, supra note 265, at 746.
375. See Deborah Jones Merritt, supra note 265, at 746.
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state. Regulation is needed if one state's negative practices-such
as permitting unregulated pollution, child labor, or marijuana
use-will contaminate other states. 376 However, the right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide in one state can only contaminate other states
if their citizens come to believe that it is a right they want for their
own and "the Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to legis-
late against such infection. ' 377 Furthermore, Oregon's law has ex-
isted for two years, causing no disruption in other states. Thus, the
PRPA is less likely to be regulating interstate commerce here be-
cause it is attempting to prevent a state from meeting the needs of
citizens drawn to its innovative policy.
Returning to the question of whether the PRPA regulates a com-
mercial activity, there is a rational argument that writing a pre-
scription for a controlled substance is a commercial activity that
Congress may regulate. Conversely, one might frame the argu-
ment that Congress is not regulating commerce in the PRPA as
follows: while drugs travel in interstate commerce, a terminally ill
patient's decision to ask a doctor for a prescription to end his life
and a doctor's decision to comply are medical rather than commer-
cial decisions. Because the PRPA permits doctors to prescribe con-
trolled substances as long as their intent is not to assist suicide, the
Act is regulating the only significant variable, a doctor's intent. Or,
to put it differently, if Doctor A gives patient B ten morphine tab-
lets for pain and she dies, and Doctor C gives patient D ten mor-
phine tablets intending to help her die, only doctor C will be
prosecuted. While both doctors might be participating in interstate
commerce by prescribing medication, only their intentions would
be monitored under the PRPA, and a doctor's intent is not a com-
mercial activity. In Lopez, the Court found that although guns
might travel in interstate commerce, mere possession of a gun was
not a commercial activity.378
Furthermore, the relatively small number of assisted suicides in
Oregon does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce
even in the aggregate (and aggregation would be allowed only if
the decision to commit suicide or the doctor's intent were commer-
cial activities).379 The small subset of Oregonians availing them-
selves of the right to prescriptions for terminal doses of medication
376. See Charles Fried, Op-Ed, Leave the Personal to the States, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 1999, at A35.
377. Id.
378. 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
379. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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(twenty-three prescriptions written in 1998; thirty-three written in
1999) under highly controlled and regulated circumstances does
not upset the war on drugs. Congress' regulatory scheme to limit
the sale and use of illegal drugs is in no way hindered by allowing
Oregon's law to remain vital. Moreover, medical regulation
touches an area of traditional state control. Lopez precludes the
federal government from invading areas of traditional state regula-
tion. Upheld, this statute might open the door to federal interven-
tion into other areas of medicine traditionally regulated by the
states.38° Overall, the Court may find that, in drafting the PRPA,
Congress is "[using] a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an
excuse for broad general regulation of state private activities."
381
C. Application of the Fifth Amendment to the PRPA
As implemented, the PRPA may tread on the rights of both doc-
tors and patients to equal protection under the law.
1. The Rights of Patients to Adequate Pain Care
Patients bringing a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection claim
would argue that they have a fundamental right to pain relief but
cannot receive equal access to that right under this law because
doctors are intimidated by a vague "intent" standard. In Gluck-
sberg, several justices implied that there may be a fundamental
right to receive medication for pain relief, particularly at the end of
life. Justice O'Connor (joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer)
appeared to rest her decision that there is no fundamental right to
assisted suicide on the fact that terminally ill patients who are suf-
fering great pain have access, in New York and Washington, to
medication even if this medication might hasten death.382 If pa-
tients could not readily obtain opioids for pain relief, she might
rule differently. Justice Breyer wrote that if state law prevented
adequate provision of pain relief at the end of life, he would recon-
sider the physician-assisted suicide issue.383 Justice Stevens, who
wrote that providing adequate pain relief is of the utmost impor-
380. The analysis above was inspired by David Kopel and Glenn Reynolds' analysis
of partial-birth abortion in the context of the Commerce Clause. See Kopel & Reyn-
olds, supra note 269, at 104.
381. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, n.27 (1968)).
382. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997).
383. See id. at 792.
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tance, might also see the right to adequate pain relief at the end of
life as fundamental.3 4
Opponents of the PRPA contend that, although the amendment
may be intended to expand pain relief, it may have the opposite
effect. Our nation's war on drugs, which has engendered negative
attitudes towards narcotic medications, has made many doctors
hesitant to prescribe these medications in dosages that can effec-
tively control severe pain.385 Doctors fear turning patients into ad-
dicts and, furthermore, are not willing to risk scrutiny by, and
possible civil or criminal penalties from, the DEA or state medical
licensing boards.386 Until 1999, doctors had been investigated only
for over-prescribing narcotic medications.387 Although amend-
ments to the PRPA were proposed to increase doctor's due process
rights by requiring the government to prove a doctor's intention to
cause death, or by allowing a doctor an affirmative defense of no
intent, these amendments were rejected.388 Doctors who are am-
bivalent about narcotics and fear the expensive and time-consum-
ing process of defending themselves in an investigation by
authorities would have every incentive to under-prescribe.
Supporters of the PRPA would argue that, on the contrary, doc-
tors will feel more free to prescribe pain medication because this
amendment clarifies that doctors are fully within their rights to
prescribe large doses of pain medication, even if it hastens death.
Only doctors who give medication with the intention of assisting a
suicide are not within the Act and may be prosecuted. Following
this understanding, the DEA, and probably state medical boards,
would have to judge a doctor's intent after the fact. Intent is diffi-
cult to gauge. Furthermore, lawyers have stated that intent can be
established not only where the doctor knew his prescription would
lead to death, but also where he should reasonably have assumed
so. 389 Accepting this definition of "intent," it would be difficult le-
gally to distinguish between the culpability of a doctor who gave a
prescription to a patient intending that the patient die, and one
who says that he did not intend that the patient die, yet he reasona-
384. See id. at 747.
385. See supra note 285.
386. See id.
387. See id. In 1999, in an unusual occurrence that may become more common in
the future, the Oregon Medical Board censured a physician for under-prescribing
medication for people in great pain. The Board was newly sensitized to the issue of
pain because of widespread discussion over the Death with Dignity Act. See id.
388. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
2000] 1789
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
bly could have assumed that this high level of medication would
kill the patient. The DEA has stressed its reluctance to make judg-
ments on appropriate prescribing practices since even doctors are
in stark disagreement. 390 Although law enforcement personnel
would, under the PRPA, receive education on the necessary and
legitimate use of controlled substances for pain management,391
their education could hardly achieve the level of highly trained
physicians who have reached no consensus in this area.
Thus, a Fifth Amendment claim would center on the vague "in-
tent" provision of the PRPA. Theoretically, the Court could be
presented with terminally ill respondents who could show that they
have received inadequate pain relief because of their doctors' fear
of DEA investigation and the threat of criminal prosecution. They
should argue that this Act, by creating a hard to interpret standard
of "intent," has lead to erratic application of the right granted doc-
tors to prescribe pain medication because some doctors feel they
are protected while others fear they are now at risk of increased
scrutiny. If the Court judges pain control at the end of life to be a
fundamental right, it would apply strict scrutiny to the provision
that endangers this right. The Court should find that the PRPA, as
applied, robs patients of their right to equal protection of their fun-
damental right to pain relief and is unconstitutional. If the Court
finds that there is no fundamental right to pain relief and applies a
lesser standard than strict scrutiny, it could also find that the pa-
tient's right to adequate pain control supersedes any interest the
government may have in limiting the right to physician-assisted sui-
cide through the PRPA.
2. Physicians' Rights to Equal Protection
Representative Hyde and Senator Nickles offer assurances that
the DEA would continue to defer to state medical boards after
passage of the PRPA, and that the issue of intent would arise only
in Oregon.392 There, it would be easy for DEA officials to gauge a
doctor's intent to assist a suicide because the doctor, complying
with state law, would fill out forms documenting his participation
in the death.393 It seems unlikely, however, that a national law
would be implemented in one state only. If this were so, Oregon
doctors would have an equal protection claim that the law as im-
390. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
393. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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plemented applies standards to only a few doctors whereas the ma-
jority of physicians need not comply. It is likely that such an
argument would prevail, particularly if the doctors could show
widespread prescription of large doses of opioids in other states.
D. Provisional Adjudication
By finding the PRPA unconstitutional, the Court can continue to
study the effects of physician-assisted suicide in Oregon. Provi-
sional adjudication allows the Court to postpone decision making
until time has passed to allow observation of how a policy has
worked.394 Although congressional supporters of the PRPA have
stressed the need for uniform standards395 and the Court has
sought that aim as well,396 precedent also exists to let issues
ripen.397 For example, in the case of Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act, the Court refused in 1997 to review a Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision that allowed the law to be implemented.398 Chief
Justice Rehnquist has stated that debate should continue on this
issue.399 The Court expressed fear in Glucksberg and Quill of vol-
untary or involuntary euthanasia and the potential injury to vulner-
able populations were assisted suicide to be permitted.400 They
might have wished to see whether a state could craft a law that
could prevent abuses, in which case the Court might recognize a
limited right to this choice at some future date. Professor Michael
Dorf has written that "it is reasonable to suppose that the possibil-
ity of state experimentation was a critical factor in the Court's re-
jection of" a right to assisted suicide in Glucksberg and Quill.40 1
Provisional adjudication could not be applied directly in the case
of the PRPA because applying it would require the Court to let
that law stand. Rather, the Court could apply the philosophy un-
derlying provisional adjudication by overturning the PRPA but
noting that on a future occasion, if the assisted-suicide experiment
fails, the Court might allow a limitation on the right to assisted
suicide in a properly crafted bill. Two years has not been enough
time to evaluate whether Oregon's law is working well. It appears
394. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
396. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816), discussed supra note 323.
397. See supra note 325.
398. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 927
(1997).
399. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
400. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808-09 (1997); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 733.
401. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
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that only a small number of people avail themselves of the right to
die and that they are not disproportionately poor, uneducated, un-
insured or lacking in end of life care.4 °2 A strong motive for their
choice of assisted suicide appears to be a desire for autonomy and
personal control.40 3 Oregon might be viewed by some as a "coura-
geous state ...[willing to] serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. ' 40 4 The nation can benefit from allowing this experiment
to continue.
CONCLUSION
It is understandable that in our heterogeneous society, people of
good conscience can disagree on the wisdom of physician-assisted
suicide. This issue touches on people's fundamental beliefs about
life, death, religion, autonomy and dignity. It is precisely when an
issue arises that lacks national consensus, that one state's desire to
experiment responsibly with a novel solution should be respected.
The PRPA is a premature attempt by opponents of physician-as-
sisted suicide to cut off experimentation and debate on a contro-
versial social issue, an issue of passionate importance to most
Oregonians. Although the PRPA would not overrule the Death
with Dignity Act entirely, it would severely limit its effectiveness
by proscribing the most common method of allowing patients a
gentle death. The majority in the Supreme Court, as supporters of
state sovereignty and an equitable balance between federal and
state powers, should overrule the PRPA and allow the Oregon ex-
periment to continue. Such a decision would not only be fair to
Oregon but also would benefit all states by enabling them to con-
tinue to observe whether, in certain circumstances, physician-as-
sisted suicide is just, proper and manageable.
402. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
403. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
404. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 386-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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